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In this dissertation I analyze performance of the contract for options in various
settings.
In the second chapter, I consider a contract for options between a supplier and
a manufacturer in the presence of a spot market with uncertain spot price, limited
supplier capacity, and where the manufacturer must fulﬁll the stochastic demand
of a downstream supply-chain link in full. I model the contract negotiation as a
two-stage Stackelberg game in which the supplier is the leader. I derive a closed-
form expression for the optimal number of options that the manufacturer should
purchase, and show the (unrestrictive) conditions under which the supplier’s proﬁt
is unimodal in the reservation and exercise prices. I make observations based on
analytical results and numerical experimentation to assess when such a contract is
incentive compatible for the players and eﬀective in coordinating the channel.
In the third chapter, I analyze diﬀerent mechanisms that lead to channel co-
ordination. Speciﬁcally, I show channel coordination is achieved by a contract for
options when the manufacturer is the leader, when a quantity discount contract is
used, and when renegotiation is allowed. I demonstrate how diﬀerent coordinating
mechanisms aﬀect the allocation of the proﬁts between the supplier and the man-
ufacturer and give some insight on when each mechanism might be appropriate. I
highlight the desirability of renegotiation as a coordinating mechanism by show-ing that it is robust – coordination is achieved despite information asymmetry –
and leads to a more equitable sharing of the contract beneﬁts than do the other
mechanisms.
In the forth chapter, I evaluate capacity investment decisions of the players
in the supply chain consisting of a supplier and two identical manufacturers. I
compare the performance of the linear-price contract (when the supplier must use
an allocation mechanism) with that of the contract for options. I demonstrate
that when the supplier sets transfer prices, the contract for options performs only
slightly better than the linear-price contract, which implies that the contract for
options is not always an obvious choice over the linear-price contract.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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Introduction
Recently, signiﬁcant research has been done on the analysis of diﬀerent contracts
and their ability to improve and coordinate supply chain performance. It has been
shown that when the transfer prices and order quantities are set properly contracts
can signiﬁcantly beneﬁt the supply chain and its members. Some contracts can also
let all participating parties equally share beneﬁts and risks. In fact, many real-
world companies aﬀected by widespread globalization, unstable exchange rates,
highly volatile spot market prices, and unpredictable demand ﬂuctuations turn to
contracts in order to mitigate any negative eﬀects on the ﬁrm’s performance.
One of the contracts commonly used in practice is a contract for options. In
this contract, the buyer has an opportunity but not an obligation to buy a certain
amount of product when he needs it. To do that, he must ﬁrst reserve a certain
amount of capacity at speciﬁed reservation price. When the actual demand comes,
the buyer can buy product at a speciﬁed exercise price up to the amount of re-
served capacity. The leader (can be either the supplier or her customer) chooses
prices: reservation price and exercise price, and the follower chooses the reservation
quantity.
This dissertation oﬀers some insights on this topic. In particular, I show that
the contract for options can provide signiﬁcant beneﬁts to the systems and their
suppliers and manufacturers. I analyze the performance of this contract in diﬀerent
supply chains and for diﬀerent parameters of the system.
The ﬁrst two chapters of this dissertation are devoted to the analysis of con-
tractual agreements between a single supplier and a single manufacturer in the
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presence of a spot market. In the ﬁrst chapter, I consider a contract for options
when the supplier is the leader. I show how the optimal contract parameters should
be chosen. I evaluate incentive compatibility of this contract for the players and
its eﬃciency in the supply chain. I demonstrate that while the contract for options
can signiﬁcantly improve supply chain performance it does not coordinate the sys-
tem. I show that the contract for options is the most beneﬁcial to the supplier and
the manufacturer when both the spot market margin and the demand variability
are high. At the same time, however, the whole supply chain beneﬁts from this
contract the most when the spot market margin is high and either demand or spot
market price variability is low. I show that the manufacturer would always prefer
a competitive supplier (one who can sell proﬁtably to the spot market) with suﬃ-
cient capacity. Only a supplier who satisﬁes these requirements is in a position to
oﬀer adequate contract terms.
The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of various mechanisms that lead
to the channel coordination. I show that supply chain coordination can be achieved
with a contract for options when the manufacturer is the leader, with a quantity-
discount contract and with the contract for options when players can renegotiate
contract parameters at the later stage. The two former coordinating mechanisms
always give all beneﬁts generated by the contract to the leader. A quantity-discount
contract might also require an additional transfer payment that is positive only
when the contracted quantity is equal to the centralized production quantity. In
contrast, renegotiation allows the players to share the beneﬁts and does not require
any additional transfer payments. It turns out that with renegotiation the supplier
always sets her production quantity equal to the centralized production quantity.
Coordination in this case is achieved even if the manufacturer sets her reservation3
quantity below the centralized level. I emphasize the eﬀectiveness of renegotiation
in this case and show that it also leads to supply chain coordination even when
the players have asymmetric information about demand.
In the third chapter, I consider a supply chain consisting of a single supplier
and two manufacturers. All players must make their capacity investment decision
prior to the demand realization. I analyze how contractual arrangements as well
as allocation rules aﬀect the players’ decisions. I show that when a linear-price
contract is used, the players choose the same capacity level with either proportional
or linear allocation rule. I also show that the players do not change their capacity
investment even if they plan to manipulate their order at the later stage. I compare
the contract for options with the linear-price contract and evaluate their relative
performance in this supply chain. I show that the beneﬁts produced by the contract
for options are not signiﬁcantly greater than the ones produced by the linear-price
contract, but that is only the case when the supplier sets transfer prices. Hence,
for this particular supply chain a contract that is easier to implement should be
used. Which contract is easiest to implement likely depends on the circumstances.
A contract for options has the advantage that it does not require an allocation
rule. It does, however, have the disadvantage that it sometimes requires that the
supplier be charged a penalty cost to guarantee that it builds suﬃcient capacity
so it can supply the reserved order quantity.
Overall, I conclude that the contract for options signiﬁcantly improves the sup-
ply chain’s performance, but does not coordinate the system. However, when some
additional mechanisms are added to this contract, it can lead to channel coordina-
tion. Because the contract for options allows the supplier and the manufacturers
to share the risks, it can have a signiﬁcant practical value. However, for certain4
supply chains the contract for options does not produce signiﬁcantly higher ben-
eﬁts than the linear-price contract so as to justify its administration for that sole
reason. Thus, one might want to take into account other aspects of the system
before making a decision about contract structure.Chapter 2
Supplier-Manufacturer Relationships
Under Forced Compliance Contracts
2.1 Introduction
Today, many retailers are adopting lean strategies to improve eﬃciency including
Wal-Mart, The Limited, J. C. Penney, Sears Roebuck and Co. The 1993 Standard
& Poor’s retailing report emphasized that keeping shelves reliably stocked to min-
imize lost sales and “eﬃcient warehousing, transportation, and delivery systems
are among the elements of successful retailing” (see Abernathy et al. (1994)).
Manufacturers that supply lean retailers must fulﬁll orders accurately, rapidly,
and eﬃciently, despite demand volatility, by appropriately structuring their pro-
duction and transportation processes. The outsourcing of transportation has be-
come common; in this case a contract might be struck that speciﬁes how much
capacity a logistics provider guarantees to the manufacturer. Given that the de-
mand for transportation services varies day by day in the “lean retailer” context,
the contract must take into account the manufacturer’s risk of not fulﬁlling the
retailer’s demand if the transportation requirements exceed the agreed upon ca-
pacity and the logistics provider’s risk of not using all of the committed capacity.
The use of electronic spot markets for transportation has become prevalent and
oﬀers one means to mitigate these risks — the transportation provider can sell
unused capacity while the manufacturer can secure additional transportation ser-
vices when the logistics provider’s promised capacity is insuﬃcient. In this paper
we analyze a contract in this context and its capability to mitigate the eﬀects of
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demand and spot price uncertainties, as well as how each party, and the supply
chain in total, beneﬁts from the contract.
We analyze a contract for options for non-storable products or services, such as
transportation, between a single supplier and a single manufacturer in the presence
of a spot market, where the supplier has limited capacity and the manufacturer
must fulﬁll stochastic demand from a downstream supply chain link. For clarity,
we focus on the situation where the manufacturer must fulﬁll downstream demand
in full, but we show later that this assumption can be relaxed.
The manufacturer minimizes her cost while negotiating supply from two sources:
contracting with a supplier for options, and a spot market. The supplier maxi-
mizes proﬁt by appropriately setting the production quantity, reservation price per
option sold, and an exercise price per unit delivered. We assume that the quantity
of goods desired by the manufacturer is always available on the spot market at
some price, that the spot market price is exogenous, and that neither the supplier
nor the buyer is of suﬃcient size to have a perceptible eﬀect on it.
Modeling the presence of the spot market in conjunction with a contract for
options is an important extension of the literature. Spot markets have not often
been included in supply chain contracting models, although many commodities are
traded on spot markets, that are used by suppliers to clear excess production and
by customers for supply when contracted quantities fall short of requirements.
We show that the manufacturer’s cost function is convex and provide a closed-
form expression for the optimal reservation quantity. We provide nonrestrictive
conditions under which the supplier’s proﬁt function is unimodal in the forward
and exercise prices, and show analytical expressions for the optimal contract terms.
In our numerical tests, the supplier’s (leader’s) proﬁt increased by a greater7
percentage than was the manufacturer’s cost reduced whenever the contract was
practically incentive compatible. We demonstrate, using the centralized case as a
benchmark, that even though the total coordination of the channel with a contract
for options is impossible, the supply chain performance can come very close to
that of the centralized system performance. The contract helps to decrease the
diﬀerence in proﬁt between centralized and decentralized systems by as much as
99%, in the best case, and at least 36%, in the worst case, for the parameters that
we tested. We found that the contract performs best when the margin paid in the
spot market is high and either demand or spot market price variability is low.
In Section 2.2 we provide a literature review on spot markets and supply chain
contracting for options. In Section 2.3 we describe our model. In Section 2.4 we
formulate our model, give an analytical solution to the manufacturer’s problem
and demonstrate that the objective function in the supplier’s problem is unimodal
in forward price and in exercise price. Section 2.5 gives the main results for the
centralized supply chain and decentralized supply chain without a contract. In Sec-
tion 2.6 we provide results of numerical examples and comparison of the contract
performance for diﬀerent parameters of the system. Section 2.7 gives extensions
to this problem. We present our conclusions in Section 2.8.
2.2 Literature Review
When no commitment is attached to the buyer’s order the buyer tends to inﬂate
her forecast and leave the supplier with excessive inventory. As a result, one of the
questions addressed in the supply chain contract literature is how the supplier can
provide the buyer with suﬃcient ﬂexibility while not assuming all the risk due to
demand uncertainty.8
There is an extensive literature dealing with such risk sharing. Eppen and
Iyer (1997) focus on “backup agreements”. The buyer commits to y units, takes
immediate delivery of (1 − ρ)y units and then, after observing sales data for the
ﬁrst two weeks, updates her information and decides how many of the remaining
ρy units she will procure. There is a penalty cost b for each unit ordered but not
actually purchased. The paper reports that a backup agreement can signiﬁcantly
improve the system performance for certain combinations of b and ρ.
Quantity ﬂexibility (QF) contracts are another way to provide the buyer with
some ﬂexibility. Tsay (1999) analyzes a QF contract in which the buyer can adjust
her initial order by a certain percentage. The author shows a closed-form mapping
between transfer price and ﬂexibility parameters that allows the system to per-
form optimally. Bassok and Anupindi (1998) consider a T-period horizon where
the buyer originally forecasts her purchases and then can adjust each period’s pur-
chase one time within speciﬁed percentage bounds. The problem is very complex,
and so the authors ultimately propose a heuristic policy. Milner and Rosenblatt
(2002) analyze a model in which the buyer places orders for two periods and, af-
ter observing demand in the ﬁrst period, may adjust her second order for which
there is per-unit adjustment fee. The authors characterize the optimal adjustment
strategy, but show no closed-form solution for the initial order.
Several papers analyze whether the contract for options can coordinate the
channel and ensure incentive compatibility for both players, or whether some ad-
ditional mechanisms are needed. Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002) investigate a two-
period model with a single supplier acting as a leader and a single buyer, in which
the buyer can purchase a certain number of options as well as place a ﬁrm or-
der each period. Cachon and Lariviere (2001) consider a similar model (where9
the buyer acts as a leader), and analyze two diﬀerent compliance regimes (vol-
untary compliance and forced compliance) and two diﬀerent information sharing
cases (full information and asymmetric information). The authors show that the
contract compliance regime signiﬁcantly aﬀects the outcome of the game.
To our observation, although spot markets exist for many products and aﬀect
the decisions made by suppliers and buyers of such goods, the literature dealing
with a spot market as an additional source of procurement or sale of products
is not extensive. Araman et al. (2001) analyze a model with a spot market in
which the supplier’s predetermined pricing scheme depends on both the reserved
capacity level and the amount purchased. There is no forward price in this model,
and the spot market price is a function of the demand. In this model, unlike ours,
the buyer must always purchase ﬁrst from the supplier up to the reserved capacity,
and only then can go to the spot market to satisfy the remaining demand. The
authors numerically compute the optimal mix between these two channels.
Among the papers we found, Wu et al. (2002) and Spinler et al. (2002) are
the closest to ours. The setting in Wu et al. is similar to ours: it includes options
on the capacity, a Stackelberg game in which the supplier is a leader, and a spot
market. These authors assume that the demand is deterministic and is a function
of the spot price which is, in turn, state contingent. Spinler et al. analyze a model
that is very similar to that in Wu et al., but with an additional assumption that
both the demand and the production cost are state contingent. In contrast to these
papers, we assume stochastic demand that is independent of the spot price. Also,
neither Wu et al., nor Spinler et al., require the buyer to satisfy all demand as we
do in this paper, but rather determine the quantity that maximizes the indirect
utility of the buyer. As a consequence, some results that we present here are10
diﬀerent. For example, we show that the exercise price is set at the level such that
the probability that the spot price would exceed the exercise price is very small;
Wu et al. conclude that the exercise price will be equal to the production cost. In
addition, we assess contract eﬀectiveness, and analyze incentive compatibility for
the supplier and the manufacturer.
By analyzing a contract for options in a spot market setting, we simultaneously
extend two streams of literature — we apply a contract for options to a new setting
and assess the eﬀect of spot markets under a new contractual setting. We also add
to the research on spot markets by developing a model that is appropriate when
the buyer (the manufacturer in our model) supplies a lean customer with varying
demand and is able to gauge the eﬀect of stochastic demand.
2.3 A Description of the Model
We consider a two-stage problem with a single supplier and single manufacturer.
The supplier has a limited capacity of K units, and incurs a cost of b per each
unit that he makes available. (In our transportation example b can be viewed as
cost of keeping trucks in a working condition ready to serve the customers.) For
a complete list of notation see Table 2.1.
The manufacturer faces a random demand D with cumulative distribution func-
tion F(.), p.d.f. f(.) and expected value D. We assume that the manufacturer
must always satisfy the demand in full.
We assume that the quantity of goods desired by the manufacturer is always
available on the spot market at some price PS with cumulative distribution H(.),
p.d.f. h(.) and expected value PS. Given the structure of the problem, we assume
that D ≥ 0 and PS ≥ 0. The analysis presented in this paper can be easily11
Table 2.1: Notation
K - supplier’s capacity
b - production cost per unit
m - spot market margin per unit
s - reservation price per option
g - exercise price per option
Q - number of options purchased by manufacturer
q - number of options exercised
qS - number of units purchased on the spot market
QP - supplier’s production quantity
PS - spot market price
D - demand random variable
F(.) - demand c.d.f.
f(.) - demand p.d.f.
H(.) - spot price c.d.f.
h(.) - spot price p.d.f.
f PS - realization of the spot price variable
e D - realization of the demand variable
PS - expected spot market price
D - expected demand
extended for the case when either distribution has ﬁnite support. The distributions
of demand and spot market price are common knowledge for the buyer and the
manufacturer, and are independent of one another. Practically this means that
neither supplier nor buyer has any perceptible eﬀect on the spot price because12
they represent just a small fraction of the whole market. We also assume that
when the supplier sells to the spot market he must pay a ﬁxed margin m per unit
for clearing the market. We assume this simple form for the spot market margin for
clarity of exposition although we show later that our results hold for more general
forms.
-
Stage 1 Stage 2
S Announces
(s,g)
6
M Sets Q
S Sets QP
6
PS,D
realized
6
M
Sets q
6
S Clears
Production on
Spot Market
6
Legend:
S — Supplier
M — Manufacturer
Figure 2.1: Event Timeline
We model our problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game in which the supplier
is a leader (See Figure 3.1.) At stage 1, the supplier oﬀers the manufacturer a
contract with parameters s and g, where s is a price per unit of capacity reserved
and g is a price per unit of the product actually purchased at stage 2. We deﬁne
P = s+g as the total price that the manufacturer pays for each unit delivered from
the supplier. Given s and g, the manufacturer reserves a certain amount of capacity
Q (Q ≤ K) from the supplier. The supplier subsequently determines a production
quantity, QP, which we require to be at least as great as the quantity reserved by
the manufacturer, QP ≥ Q. This constraint reﬂects the contractual requirement13
for the supplier to deliver up to Q units if called upon by the manufacturer and the
circumstance when the supplier produces the goods rather than resells goods that
he procures on the spot market. A supplier would do so when either it focuses on
producing a good or a service rather than on being a broker or because the supplier
is unwilling to risk its reputation selling goods that are produced by another ﬁrm
and that may be inferior.
At the beginning of the stage 2, D and PS are realized. After observing this
information, the manufacturer decides how much to order from the supplier, q, and
how much to buy on the spot market, qS. The manufacturer can view the spot
market as an alternative source of the product: If the spot market price is below
the supplier’s exercise price g, then the manufacturer buys only from the spot
market; otherwise, she buys from the spot market only if the reserved capacity is
insuﬃcient to satisfy the demand in full. After the manufacturer’s order is ﬁlled,
we assume that the supplier can sell all his excess inventory to the spot market at
some price, which may or may not be proﬁtable.
2.4 Analysis
We solve this problem using backward induction, assuming that the decision-maker
at each step acts optimally and anticipates optimal behavior from other decision-
makers in each subsequent step.
2.4.1 Stage 2 Manufacturer’s Problem
We start with the stage 2 manufacturer’s problem. At stage 2 both the spot market
price and the demand are known, and the manufacturer must decide how many
options to exercise and how many units to buy on the spot market. She must solve14
a deterministic linear problem:
(M2) min
q,qS
C2(q,qS) = gq + f PSqS
subject to: Q ≥ q ≥ 0,qS ≥ 0,
q + qS = e D,
where e D and f PS are realizations of the corresponding random variables. The ﬁrst
inequality states that the manufacturer can order from the supplier no more than
the number of options purchased, and the second inequality speciﬁes that the
manufacturer must satisfy the demand in full. The proof for the next proposition
is straightforward.
Proposition 1 The solution to the Problem M2 is given by:
(q
∗,q
∗
S) =

 
 
(0, e D) for g > PS,
(min(Q, e D),(e D − q)) for g ≤ PS.
2.4.2 Stage 1 Manufacturer’s Problem
At stage 1 the manufacturer must decide how much capacity to reserve from the
supplier. Her goal is to minimize the expected cost she incurs from using both the
supplier and the spot market. The manufacturer solves the problem:
(M1) min
Q
C(Q) = ED,PS[PS(D − q
∗) + sQ + gq
∗]
subject to: 0 ≤ Q ≤ K,
where q∗ is the solution of Problem M2. The ﬁrst term in the objective function is
the cost associated with buying from the spot market, the second term is the cost
of reserving capacity, and the third term is the cost of purchasing product from15
the supplier. The constraint indicates that the manufacturer cannot reserve more
capacity than the supplier has available.
This is a newsvendor problem, which allows the following result. For conve-
nience, we deﬁne the loss function
LH(g) =
Z ∞
g
(y − g)dH(y).
Proposition 2 The solution to M1 is given by Q = min(Q∗,K), where
Q
∗(s,g) =

 
 
F −1

LH(g)−s
LH(g)

if s
LH(g) ≤ 1,
0 otherwise
. (2.1)
Proof. After some elementary operations, the objective function in the prob-
lem M1 can be rewritten as
C(Q) = PS · D + sQ
− LH(g)
Z Q
0
Df(D)dD + Q
Z ∞
Q
f(D)dD

,
the ﬁrst derivative of which is
∂C
∂Q
= s − LH(g)(1 − F(Q)).
The second derivative is
∂2C
∂Q2 = f(Q)LH(g) > 0,
which implies that the objective function is strictly convex. Thus, if s/LH(g) ≤ 1
then the optimal amount of capacity reserved by the manufacturer, Q, is equal to
the minimum of capacity K, or the solution obtained by setting the ﬁrst derivative
equal to zero as shown in (2.1). Otherwise, we set reservation quantity equal to 0.16
The expected beneﬁt from the use of an additional option is (LH(g) + g) −
(s + g), and the cost of an additional option is s. The reader can verify that the
critical fractile in (2.1) is indeed the ratio of the expected beneﬁt to the sum of the
expected beneﬁt and cost of an additional option. It also follows from Proposition
2 that in a meaningful contract (i.e., a contract with 0 < Q∗ < ∞) the following
inequality holds:
0 < s < LH(g).
The intuition behind this result is that paying s to reserve supply is the manufac-
turer’s “insurance policy” against having to pay in excess of g on the spot market.
It only makes sense for the manufacturer to pay a value of s that is no greater
than the expected diﬀerence between the spot market price and g. It is also true
that s 6= 0, because F(Q∗) = 1 at s = 0 according to (2.1), and thus Q∗ = ∞. We
also notice that because LH(g) is decreasing in g, F(Q∗) is decreasing in g and s,
as is Q∗.
2.4.3 Stage 1 Supplier’s Problem
At this stage the supplier must set the prices s and g to motivate the manufacturer
to reserve the amount of capacity that maximizes the supplier’s expected proﬁt.
Therefore, the supplier must solve this problem:
(S1) max
s,g,QP
π(s,g,QP) = ED,PS[sQ
∗ + (PS − m)(QP − q
∗) + gq
∗ − QPb]
subject to: Q
∗ ≤ QP ≤ K,
s ≥ 0, g ≥ 0,
where q∗ is the solution of Problem M2, and Q∗ is the solution of Problem M1.17
The Optimal QP
Proposition 3 Problem S1 is linear in QP, and thus can be separated into two
cases.
Case I: If PS − m ≥ b, then QP = K.
Case II: If PS − m < b, then QP = Q
∗.
Proof. We can rewrite the objective function as
π(s,g,QP) = (PS − m − b)QP + sQ
∗
−
Z ∞
g
(PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

.
The problem is linear in QP, and thus the optimal QP depends on the sign of
PS − m − b. The result follows immediately.
We will refer to the supplier in Case I as a competitive supplier, and in Case
II as a noncompetitive supplier.
Optimality Conditions for s Under Unconstrained Supplier’s Capacity
In this section we demonstrate how the supplier should determine the optimal
price s. In order to do this we need to make certain assumptions on the demand
distribution function. We say that a distribution has an increasing failure rate
(IFR) if r0(x) > 0 for r(x) =
f(x)
1−F(x), and we say that a distribution has an increasing
generalized failure rate (IGFR) if u0(x) > 0 for u(x) = xr(x). The distribution
that is IFR is also IGFR, but the converse is not always true. Normal, uniform,
truncated normal, Erlang, and triangular are all examples of IFR distributions.
The class of IGFR functions includes these IFR distributions as well as Weibull
and Gamma distributions. So, this condition is suﬃciently broad to capture most
of the distributions one would use for demand and spot price.18
Let us denote the failure rates of the demand and spot price distributions
by rF(.) and rH(.) respectively, and the generalized failure rate of the demand
distribution function by uF(.).
Proposition 4 Case I. If PS−m ≥ b, then the objective function of S1 is concave
with respect to s for IFR demand distribution functions, and unimodal in s for
IGFR demand distribution functions.
Case II. If PS − m < b, then the objective function of S1 is unimodal with
respect to s for IFR demand distribution functions.
Proof. Case I.
Suppose PS − m ≥ b, then QP = K and the objective function takes the
following form
π(s,g,QP) = K(PS − m − b) + sQ
∗
−
Z ∞
g
(PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

.
The ﬁrst derivative
∂π
∂s
= Q
∗ −
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g)rF(Q∗)
,
and the second derivative
∂2π
∂s2 =
∂Q∗
∂s
+
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g)
·
r0
F(Q∗)
(rF(Q∗))2 ·
∂Q∗
∂s
.
It is easy to see that if the demand distribution function is IFR, or r0
F(Q∗) > 0,
then the second derivative of π(s,g,QP) is negative, because
∂Q∗
∂s
= −
1
f(F −1(1 − s
LH(g)))
·
1
LH(g)
< 0
and, therefore the objective function is strictly concave in s.19
If the demand distribution function is IGFR, then we rewrite the ﬁrst derivative
as
∂π
∂s
= Q
∗
(
1 −
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g)uF(Q∗)
)
.
At s = 0,Q∗ = ∞ and ∂π
∂s = ∞. As s increases, Q∗ is decreases and, so does uF(.).
Also, ∂π
∂s|s→∞ → −∞. Hence, the objective function is unimodal in this case and
the expression in the braces changes the sign at some point where
1 −
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g)uF(Q∗)
= 0.
Case II.
Now suppose PS − m < b, then QP = Q∗ and the objective function can be
rewritten as
π(s,g,QP) = (PS − m − b + s)Q
∗
−
Z ∞
g
(PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

.
The ﬁrst derivative
∂π
∂s
= Q
∗ −
1
rF(Q∗)
·
"
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g)
−
b + m − PS
s
#
.
At s = 0, Q∗ = ∞ and ∂π
∂s = ∞. The expression in brackets stays negative
on the interval where s ≤
b+m−PS
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPSLH(g), and thus ∂π
∂s stays positive on that
interval. Now consider interval where s ≥
b+m−PS
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPSLH(g). The expression in
the brackets is an increasing function of s, Q∗ is a decreasing function of s, and
1
rF(Q∗) is an increasing function of s (because the demand distribution function is
IFR). Also, ∂π
∂s|s→∞ → −∞. Thus, at the point where
Q
∗ −
1
rF(Q∗)
·
"
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g)
−
b + m − PS
s
#
= 0
the sign of ∂π
∂schanges, i.e., the function π(s,g,QP = Q∗) is unimodal.20
Given that objective function is unimodal and continuously diﬀerentiable in s,
the following result follows directly from Proposition 4 by setting ﬁrst derivative
equal to zero.
Proposition 5 Given g, the optimal s is ﬁnite and can be determined as follows.
1. Case I. If PS − m − b ≥ 0, s is the solution of
Q
∗ −
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g)rF(Q∗)
= 0. (2.2)
2. Case II. If PS − m − b < 0, s is the solution of
Q
∗ −
1
rF(Q∗)
·
"
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g)
−
b + m − PS
s
#
= 0. (2.3)
Optimality Conditions for g Under Unconstrained Supplier’s Capacity
In this section we provide optimality conditions for g. Let us deﬁne v(g) =
1−H(g)
LH(g)
and b g as a solution of 1 − mrH(b g) = 0. The function 1/ν(g) is called a residual
mean time and it is decreasing for IFR distributions (see, for example, Shaked and
Shanthikumar (1994)).
Proposition 6 Suppose that the spot market price and the demand distributions
are IFR. Then:
1. For all s in Case I, and for s ≥
b−PS+m R ∞
b g h(PS)dPSLH(b g) in Case II: if
∂π
∂g(s,g,QP)|g=0 > 0, then the proﬁt function π(s,g,QP) is unimodal in g,
otherwise the proﬁt function is decreasing in g.
2. The optimal exercise price g∗ > 0, and is ﬁnite.21
Proof. We will consider two cases separately.
Case I.
Suppose PS − m ≥ b, then QP = K and objective function takes the following
form
π(s,g,QP = K) = K(PS − m − b) + sQ
∗
−
Z ∞
g
(PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

.
The ﬁrst derivative
∂π
∂g
(s,g,QP = K) = (1 − H(g))(1 − mrH(g))
Z Q∗
0
xf(x)dx
−
(1 − H(g))s
LH(g)
 
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
rF(Q∗)LH(g)
− (1 − mrH(g))Q
∗
!
.
We can see that ∂π
∂g(s,g,QP = K) is a continuous function of g. Let’s deﬁne
b g as a solution of 1 − mrH(g) = 0, and e g as a solution of
m
R ∞
gI
h(PS)dPS
rF(Q∗(s,e g))LH(e g) − (1 −
mrH(e g))Q∗(s,e g) = 0. Assume that e g = 0, if
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
rF(Q∗)LH(g) −(1−mrH(g))Q∗|g=0 > 0.
For g ≤ e g, we have ∂π
∂g(s,g,QP) > 0
For e g < g < b g, ∂π
∂g(s,g,QP) is decreasing in g. It follows directly from the
assumption that both rF(.) and rH(.) are IFR, Q∗ is a decreasing function of g and
1−H(g)
LH(g) is an increasing function of g.
For g ≥ b g, ∂π
∂g(s,g,QP) < 0.
Thus, if ∂π
∂g(s,g = 0,QP) > 0, then ∂π
∂g(s,g,QP) changes sign only once and,
π(s,g,QP) is unimodal in g. Otherwise, π(s,g,QP) is decreasing in g.
Now we show that optimal g > 0.22
Suppose that it is not true, then ∂π
∂g(s∗(g = 0),g = 0,QP) ≤ 0, where s∗(g = 0)
is a solution of (2.2) for g = 0. Yet, when g = 0 and s = s∗(g = 0)
∂π
∂g
(s,g,QP)|s=s∗(g=0),g=0 =
Z Q∗(0,s∗)
0
Df(D)dD > 0,
where Q∗(g = 0,s∗) = F −1(1 − s∗
PS) > 0.
Thus, optimal g > 0.
Case II.
Now suppose PS − m < b, then QP = Q∗ and the objective function can be
rewritten as
π(s,g,QP = Q
∗) = (PS − m − b + s)Q
∗
−
Z ∞
g
(PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

.
The ﬁrst derivative
∂π
∂g
(s,g,QP = Q
∗) = (1 − H(g))(1 − mrH(g))
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD
−
(1 − H(g))s
rF(Q∗)LH(g)
 R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g)
m −
b − PS + m
s
− (1 − mrH(g))rF(Q
∗)Q
∗
!
.
is again a continuous function of g. Consider this expression for s ≥
b−PS+m R ∞
b g h(PS)dPSLH(b g).
∂π
∂g is positive on the interval where
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g) m−
b−PS+m
s −(1−mrH(g))rF(Q∗)Q∗ ≤
0, decreasing on the interval where
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
LH(g) m−
b−PS+m
s −(1−mrH(g))rF(Q∗)Q∗ >
0 and g ≤ b g. ∂π
∂g is negative for g > b g. Thus, we conclude that, for such values of
s, if ∂π
∂g|g=0 > 0, then π(s,g,QP = Q∗) is unimodal, otherwise it is decreasing.
Now suppose s <
b−PS+m R ∞
b g h(PS)dPSLH(b g). In this case ∂π
∂g|g=0 > 0, also since ∂π
∂g|g→∞ →
−∞, we can say that in this case, optimal g exists, it is ﬁnite and can be deter-
mined, using necessary optimality conditions, by setting ∂π
∂g = 0.23
Since the optimal s∗ solves (2.3), we substitute this expression in the expression
for ∂π
∂g. We can see that in this case ∂π
∂g < 0 for g > b g. Thus b g provides an upper
bound on g∗ in this case.
Now we show that optimal g > 0.
Suppose that it is not true, then ∂π
∂g(s∗(g = 0),g = 0,QP) ≤ 0, where s∗(g = 0)
is a solution of (2.3) for g = 0. But, when g = 0 and s = s∗(g = 0)
∂π
∂g
(s,g,QP)|s=s∗,g=0 =
Z Q∗(0,s∗)
0
Df(D)dD > 0
where Q∗(g = 0,s∗) = F −1(1 − s∗
E(PS)) > 0.
Thus, optimal g > 0.
Proposition 6 implies that the forward contract, i.e., the contract which has
only a reservation price s > 0 and g = 0, is not optimal. We also know in Case I
from Proposition 6 that any local optimum is unique and globally optimal. From
the proof of Proposition 6 also follows that ∂π
∂g < 0 for any g > b g, thus g∗ ≤ b g.
Optimal s and g When the Supplier’s Capacity is Limited
In this section we generalize our result for the case when the supplier’s capacity is
limited. We continue to assume that the distributions of the demand and the spot
price are IFR. The results are shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The optimal contract for the limited capacity case is speciﬁed in
(2.2) or (2.3), and Proposition 6 if that solution results in Q∗ ≤ K when substituted
into (2.1). Otherwise, the optimal limited capacity contract is constrained by the
supplier’s capacity K and the optimal contract terms (sK,gK) are set according
to the solution of
(1 − mrH(gK))
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
Kf(D)dD

− K(1 − F(K)) = 0, (2.4)24
and
sK = LH(gK)(1 − F(K)). (2.5)
Proof. In general, the supplier does not know in advance whether the capacity
is not enough to produce optimal Q∗, thus, he is faced with a general problem
max
s,g,QP
π(s,g,QP) =

        
        
(PS − m − b)QP + sQ∗ −
R ∞
g (PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS
×
R Q∗
0 Df(D)dD +
R ∞
Q∗ Q∗f(D)dD

, if 1 − s
LH(g) ≤ F(K).
(PS − m − b)K + sK −
R ∞
g (PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS
×
R K
0 Df(D)dD +
R ∞
K Kf(D)dD

, if 1 − s
LH(g) ≥ F(K).
subject to : Q
∗ ≤ QP ≤ K,
s ≥ 0,g ≥ 0.
Consider the ﬁrst part of the proﬁt function. In this case the optimal pair (s,g) is
either a local maximum or a boundary point such that 1 − s
LH(g) = F(K).
Now, consider the second part of the proﬁt function. From the constraint
follows that s ≤ (1−F(K))LH(g). Since, the proﬁt function in this case is strictly
increasing in s, it implies that sK = (1−F(K))LH(g). Again, we have a boundary
solution.
We substitute the expression for sK into the objective function and optimize it
with respect to g.
The ﬁrst derivative is
∂π
∂g
(sK,g,K) = (1 − H(g))

(1 − mrH(g))
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
Kf(D)dD

−K(1 − F(K)))
Consider ∂π
∂g(sK,g,K)|g=0 =
R K
0 Df(D)dD +
R ∞
K Kf(D)dD

− K(1 − F(K))

=
R K
0 Df(D)dD ≥ 0. Since rH(g) is IFR, we see that ∂π
∂g(sK,g,K) changes the25
sign only once and, as a result, π(sK,g,K) is unimodal in g and optimal gK is a
solution of
(1 − mrH(g))
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
Kf(D)dD

− K(1 − F(K)) = 0
while optimal sK = (1 − F(K))LH(g).
2.5 The Decentralized System Without a Contract and
Centralized System
The decentralized and centralized cases provide benchmarks for evaluating the
performance of the contract. In this section we demonstrate how to calculate the
expected proﬁts and costs for each of this benchmarks. We will use superscript T
to refer to the total system, that is, the supplier and the manufacturer together.
2.5.1 The Decentralized System without Contract
Below we present expressions used to calculate expected proﬁt of the supplier and
expected cost of the manufacturer in a decentralized system without a contract,
and give an analytical expression for the additional proﬁt brought into the total
system by the contract.
Supplier. When there is no contract, the supplier sells directly to the spot
market. Denote the production quantity in the decentralized system without a
contract as
QDNC =

 
 
K if PS − m − b ≥ 0,
0 if PS − m − b < 0.
In this case, the supplier’s expected proﬁt is:26
Case I. If PS −m−b ≥ 0, then QDNC = K, and the expected proﬁt is equal to
πDNC = K(PS − m − b).
Case II. If PS − m − b < 0, then QDNC = 0 and the expected proﬁt is equal to
πDNC = 0.
Manufacturer. In a decentralized system without a contract the manufacturer
buys everything on the spot market. The expected manufacturer’s cost in this case
is equal to CDNC = D · PS.
The value of the contract to the decentralized system. We denote
the diﬀerence in proﬁts between the decentralized system with a contract and the
decentralized system without a contract as ∆πT
DC−DNC.
1. Case I. If PS − m − b ≥ 0, then
∆π
T
DC−DNC = m(1 − H(g
∗))
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

. (2.6)
2. Case II. If PS − m − b < 0, then
∆π
T
DC−DNC = Q
∗(PS−m−b)+m(1−H(g
∗))
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

.
(2.7)
2.5.2 The Centralized System
The centralized control case in which a single decision-maker optimizes the en-
tire supply chain provides another benchmark for eﬃciency of the above contract.
There are no transfer prices in the centralized system and everything that is pro-
duced by the supplier goes ﬁrst to the manufacturer to satisfy demand. The re-
maining goods (if any) are sold to the spot market. Any unmet demand is satisﬁed
through the spot market.27
The decision-maker solves the problem:
max
QCP
π
T
C(QCP) = ED,PS{(PS − m)(QCP − D)
+ − PS(D − QCP)
+ − QCPb}(C1)
subject to: QCP ≤ K,
where QCP is the supplier’s production quantity.
The objective function of C1 can be rewritten as
π
T
C(QCP) = PS(QCP − D) − m
Z QCP
0
(QCP − D)f(D)dD − QCPb.
This is a newsvendor problem. Let us denote as Q∗
CP the solution of
F(Q
∗
CP) =
PS − b
m
.
Then the optimal centralized production quantity is
QCP =

    
    
Q∗
CP if 0 ≤
PS−b
m ≤ 1 and Q∗
CP ≤ K,
K if
PS−b
m > 1 or Q∗
CP > K,
0 if
PS−b
m < 0.
To evaluate the performance of the contract, we calculate the diﬀerences in
the expected proﬁts between the centralized and decentralized system without a
contract, 4πT
C−DNC, and between the decentralized system with the contract and
decentralized system without the contract, 4πT
DC−DNC. The ratio
ρ =
∆πT
DC−DNC
4πT
C−DNC
measures the eﬀectiveness of the contract in closing the gap between the centralized
and decentralized system without a contract, where
4π
T
C−DNC =(QCP − QDNC)(PS − b − m)
+m
Z QCP
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
QCP
QCPf(D)dD

, (2.8)28
and 4πT
DC−DNC is deﬁned by (2.6) or (2.7). The following expression represents
the diﬀerence of proﬁts of centralized system and decentralized system with the
contract:
4π
T
C−DC = (QCP − QP)(PS − b − m) − m(1 − H(g
∗))· (2.9)
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

+ m
Z QCP
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
QCP
QCPf(D)dD

2.5.3 Contract Eﬀectiveness
To assess the value of the contract for the manufacturer and the supplier individ-
ually, we need to compare the expected cost and proﬁt respectively in the decen-
tralized scenarios with and without the contract. We will denote the supplier’s
relative proﬁt increase as
κ =
π − πDNC
πDNC
,
and the manufacturer’s relative cost savings as
θ =
C − CDNC
CDNC
,
where π and C refer to the supplier’s proﬁt and the manufacturer’s cost respectively
in the decentralized system with the contract as deﬁned in the previous sections.
2.6 Numerical Experimentation
In this section we provide the algorithm and parameters used for numerical ex-
periments as well as the results of these experiments and our conclusions. For
notational simplicity we use subscripts D and SP when we refer to the demand
and the spot price distributions respectively, and refer to Case I and Case II with
the subscripts I and II respectively. We denote the smallest possible value of the
demand random variable D by D.29
2.6.1 The Optimization Algorithm and Experiment Para-
meters
We chose the triangular and truncated normal distributions to model spot price
and demand distributions because they are reasonable and satisfy all the neces-
sary conditions to ensure the unimodality of the supplier’s objective function (the
distributions are IFR).
Table 2.2: Numerical Experiment Parameters.
Spot Price Demand
Scenarios Distribution CVSP Distribution CVD
1-9 Triangular 0.05, 0.2, 0.4 Triangular 0.05, 0.2, 0.4
10-13 Triangular 0.2, 0.4 Normal 0.06, 0.2
14-19 Normal 0.02, 0.06, 0.2 Triangular 0.2,0.4
20-25 Normal 0.02, 0.2 Normal 0.02, 0.06, 0.2
We ﬁrst tested the combinations of spot price and demand distributions shown
in Table 2.2 (with symmetric triangular distributions) assuming the supplier’s ca-
pacity is suﬃcient for the greatest possible demand for both Case I and Case II,
while setting m = 0.1PS,0.3PS,0.7PS for each of these scenarios. We set the mean
demand D and spot price P S equal to 30, K = 300 in all scenarios. We set the
supplier’s production cost b = 0.5 for Case I, and b = 28 for Case II. We also
modeled both the spot price and demand with a limited number of asymmetric
triangular distributions. We did not notice any diﬀerence in the general results
due to skewness, and so the analysis we present here is based on the numerical
experiments with symmetric distributions.30
We also analyzed the case with the limited capacity using the symmetric tri-
angular distribution for the spot price and demand. We chose three diﬀerent
combinations of parameters (CVSP = 0.05, CVD = 0.4, m = 0.3PS; CVSP = 0.05,
CVD = 0.05, m = 0.1PS; CVSP = 0.4, CVD = 0.4, m = 0.3PS), and varied the
capacity level (K = 5,10,15,...,60).
The foregoing theoretical analysis provides the basis for the following algorithm
to ﬁnd the optimal s∗ and g∗ for Case I. The algorithm for Case II is similar
although we need to allow for the possibility of multiple local maxima.
1. Calculate the globally optimal s∗ and g∗ for the unconstrained supplier’s proﬁt
function using Newton’s method.
2. Calculate Q∗ for (s∗,g∗) found in Step 1 using (2.1) and check whether the
condition Q∗ ≤ K is satisﬁed. If yes, stop. If no, then go to the step 3.
3. Set (s∗,g∗) = (sK,gK) using (2.4) and (2.5).
We used Newton’s method in the ﬁrst step to solve
∇π(x) = 0,
where x = (s,g)T. Newton’s method consists of successive approximations x(1),
x(2),...,x(k + 1), such that
x(k + 1) = x(k) − J
−1(k)f(k),
where f(k) = ∇π(x(k)) and J−1(k) is the inverse matrix of the Jacobian of vector
f(k). We used |f(x)|∞ ≤  as a termination criterion, and set  = 0.0005.
The results we obtained for diﬀerent distributions were structurally the same.
The CV s of the distributions and the value of m/PS aﬀected the results more than31
did which family of distributions was used. Thus the results included in the tables
are from the scenarios in which both the spot price and demand distributions are
triangular. The numerical results for the optimal s,g,P and Q are presented in
Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Results regarding contract eﬀectiveness are shown throughout
the text.
2.6.2 Results: Case I with Unconstrained Supplier’s Ca-
pacity
The supply chain with the contract does not achieve the performance of the cen-
tralized supply chain in Case I, although it provides a signiﬁcant improvement over
the performance of the decentralized system and beneﬁts both the manufacturer
and the supplier.
We observed that the contract eﬀectiveness, ρ was as high as 99% (for the
triangular and normal distribution with CVD ≥ 0.2, normal distribution with
CVSP = 0.02, and m = 0.7PS), and not less than 36% (for the triangular distrib-
ution with CVD = 0.4, triangular distribution with CVSP = 0.4, and m = 0.1PS).
The contract eﬀectiveness increased in m, decreased in CVSP, and increased (de-
creased) in CVD when CVSP < CVD (CVSP ≥ CVD). (See Table 2.5.) Thus the
contract provides value by allowing the two parties to avoid paying the spot market
margin. Furthermore, the contract is most eﬀective when the spot market margin
is high or when either the demand or the spot price variability is low.
The supplier receives a larger portion of the beneﬁts whenever the contract is
incentive compatible in a practical sense, which is expected because the supplier is
the leader, but he cannot extract all the additional value. The supplier’s relative
proﬁt κ increases from less than 1% to more than 20% as m increases from 0.1PS32
Table 2.3: Optimal contract parameters competitive versus noncompetitive suppli-
ers with unrestricted capacity for triangular spot price and demand distributions
(Part 1).
Case I Case II
Competitive Supplier Noncompetitive Supplier
CVSP CVD m/ ¯ PS sI gI PI Q∗
I sII gII PII Q∗
II
0.05 0.05 0.1 3.94 26.03 29.97 26.45 3.97 26.02 29.99 26.3
0.05 0.05 0.3 3.71 26.09 29.79 27.28 3.98 26.01 29.99 26.3
0.05 0.05 0.7 3.12 26.14 29.26 28.47 3.99 26.00 29.99 26.2
0.05 0.20 0.1 3.14 26.50 29.64 22.64 3.56 26.25 29.81 20.8
0.05 0.20 0.3 2.28 26.55 28.82 27.67 3.78 26.07 29.85 20.2
0.05 0.20 0.7 1.18 26.47 27.64 32.50 3.86 26.02 29.89 19.7
0.05 0.40 0.1 1.88 27.25 29.13 24.44 2.64 26.74 29.38 19.2
0.05 0.40 0.3 1.12 26.94 28.06 34.07 3.42 26.15 29.57 15.2
0.05 0.40 0.7 0.44 26.61 27.05 43.70 3.70 26.04 29.74 12.1
0.20 0.05 0.1 13.56 16.54 29.99 26.14 13.48 16.52 29.99 26.0
0.20 0.05 0.3 13.33 16.60 29.93 26.41 13.49 16.51 29.99 26.0
0.20 0.05 0.7 12.93 16.72 29.65 26.92 13.49 16.50 29.99 26.0
0.20 0.20 0.1 12.51 17.32 29.82 18.76 13.04 16.88 29.92 18.0
0.20 0.20 0.3 10.84 18.12 28.96 22.15 13.30 16.62 29.92 17.9
0.20 0.20 0.7 8.73 18.42 27.15 25.98 13.38 16.55 29.03 17.933
Table 2.4: Optimal contract parameters competitive versus noncompetitive suppli-
ers with unrestricted capacity for triangular spot price and demand distributions
(Part 2).
Case I Case II
Competitive Supplier Noncompetitive Supplier
CVSP CVD m/ ¯ PS sI gI PI Q∗
I sII gII PII Q∗
II
0.20 0.40 0.1 7.35 21.72 29.07 16.07 9.81 19.49 29.30 12.3
0.20 0.40 0.3 6.47 20.87 27.34 23.60 12.14 17.24 29.37 10.7
0.20 0.40 0.7 5.32 19.78 25.10 29.46 12.78 16.74 29.51 9.5
0.40 0.05 0.1 27.96 2.04 29.99 26.07 27.98 2.02 29.99 26.0
0.40 0.05 0.3 27.86 2.11 29.96 26.20 27.99 2.01 29.99 26.0
0.40 0.05 0.7 27.58 2.24 29.82 26.45 27.99 2.00 29.99 26.0
0.40 0.20 0.1 26.93 2.91 29.84 17.64 27.54 2.41 29.96 17.2
0.40 0.20 0.3 25.07 4.23 29.30 19.64 27.82 2.13 29.96 17.2
0.40 0.20 0.7 21.96 5.52 27.48 22.64 27.90 2.06 29.96 17.2
0.40 0.40 0.1 16.11 13.11 29.21 11.92 21.11 8.23 29.34 9.1
0.40 0.40 0.3 14.74 12.41 27.15 18.48 25.68 3.65 29.33 8.3
0.40 0.40 0.7 13.14 10.78 23.92 24.44 26.83 2.59 29.42 7.7
to 0.7PS (see Table 2.6). The value of κ is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the changes of
m, yet is relatively insensitive to the changes in CVD and CVSP mostly due to the
supplier’s ability to manipulate the contract prices in order to mitigate the eﬀect
of variability. The manufacturer’s cost savings θ increases from less than 1% (for34
Table 2.5: Case I. Contract Eﬀectiveness ρ for triangular spot price and demand
distributions.
CVSP
0.05 0.2 0.4
0.05 0.88/0.91/0.94 0.87/0.88/0.90 0.87/0.87/0.88
CVD 0.2 0.74/0.87/0.95 0.62/0.73/0.83 0.59/0.65/0.74
0.4 0.70/0.88/0.97 0.47/0.68/0.81 0.36/0.54/0.70
Legend – x/y/z where x, y, z denote contract eﬀectiveness ρ for
m/ ¯ PS = 0.1,0.3,0.7 respectively.
CVD < 0.2, and m = 0.1PS,0.3 PS) to more than 10% (for CVD = 0.4, CVSP ≥ 0.2,
and m = 0.7PS) as CVD and m increase (see Table 2.7). θ increases in CVSP when
either CVD or m are large, and decreases in CVSP when both these parameters
are small. The manufacturer’s relative cost savings θ does exceed the supplier’s
relative proﬁt increase κ, when CVSP < CVD and the spot market margin is small
(m = 0.1PS), although at that point both θ and κ are less than 1%. Thus, the
contract is valuable for the supplier in avoiding the spot market margin, and the
manufacturer beneﬁts from the contract whenever m, CVD and CVSP are large.
Of all the parameters tested, m has the greatest eﬀect on ρ, κ, and θ, which
all increase in m. Although contract eﬃciency decreases in demand and spot price
uncertainty, a signiﬁcant share of the contract eﬀectiveness gain is passed along to
the manufacturer only when both demand and spot price uncertainty are high —
the supplier’s “control” is apparently reduced in this situation. A contract might,
in fact, be most viable when CVD,CVPS, and m are simultaneously large. In that35
Table 2.6: Case I. Contract Eﬀect on κ with Triangular Spot Price and Demand
Distributions.
CVSP
0.05 0.2 0.4
0.05 0.01/0.04/0.23 0.01/0.04/0.22 0.01/0.04/0.22
CVD 0.2 0.007/0.03/0.21 0.007/0.03/0.18 0.006/0.03/0.16
0.4 0.006/0.03/0.21 0.004/0.02/0.16 0.003/0.02/0.13
Legend – x/y/z where x, y, z denote κ for m/ ¯ PS = 0.1,0.3,0.7 respectively.
case, contract eﬀectiveness is still signiﬁcant (ρ = 70% for CVD = CVPS = 0.2 and
m = 0.7PS), and each party’s gains are signiﬁcant (θ = 12%,κ = 13%) — both
parties are thus motivated to enter into the contract.
2.6.3 Results: Case II with Unconstrained Supplier’s Ca-
pacity
In Case II, the contract again was not able to coordinate the supply chain. Al-
though it signiﬁcantly improved system performance and proved beneﬁcial for the
supplier, the manufacturer’s cost was reduced only slightly, and so this contract
may not be incentive compatible for the manufacturer in a practical sense. Still
the analysis of the case might be useful because a simple side payment to the
manufacturer can create an incentive for her to enter the contract.
The contract eﬀectiveness increases as CVD and CVSP decrease, and as the
margin m increases. We observed that ρ is at least 37% in the worst case (for
triangular distribution with CVD = 0.4, triangular distribution with CVSP = 0.4,36
Table 2.7: Case I. Contract Eﬀect on θ with Triangular Spot Price and Demand
Distributions.
CVSP
0.05 0.2 0.4
0.05 0.001/0.006/0.02 0.0002/0.002/0.01 0.0001/0.001/0.005
CVD 0.2 0.008/0.03/0.07 0.004/0.02/0.07 0.001/0.01/0.06
0.4 0.02/0.05/0.09 0.01/0.05/0.11 0.01/0.04/0.12
Legend – x/y/z where x, y, z denote θ for m/ ¯ PS = 0.1,0.3,0.7 respectively.
and m = 0.1PS), and 98% in the best case (for normal distribution CVSP =
0.02 and m = 0.7PS). (See Table 2.8.) Among the parameters tested, demand
variability CVD had the greatest eﬀect on contract eﬀectiveness ρ.
Table 2.8: Case II. Contract Eﬀectiveness ρ for triangular spot price and demand
distributions.
CVSP
0.05 0.2 0.4
0.05 0.90/0.95/0.97 0.77/0.89/0.95 0.73/0.90/0.97
CVD 0.2 0.90/0.94/0.96 0.67/0.80/0.88 0.49/0.79/0.85
0.4 0.90/0.94/0.96 0.64/0.77/0.84 0.37/0.55/0.72
Legend – x/y/z where x, y, z denote contract eﬀectiveness for
m/ ¯ PS = 0.1,0.3,0.7 respectively.
The manufacturer’s relative cost savings θ were always below 1%. The contract
always allows the noncompetitive supplier a proﬁt, which he would not otherwise37
have, and it is greatest for low demand variability CVD and low spot price margin
m.
In Case II the values of s and g are always set at the level such that the critical
fractile F(Q∗) < 0.5, which means that the supplier sets a relatively high total price
P that not only bolsters his revenue from the manufacturer, but also minimizes
the expected loss from selling product to the spot market.
The number of options purchased by the manufacturer, Q, which in this case
equals the supplier’s production quantity, is always lower than the quantity pro-
duced in the centralized supply chain, QCP, and is due to the fact that the supplier
does not oﬀer the prices that would guarantee an optimal order quantity, and thus
an optimal production quantity. The diﬀerence QCP − Q increases as CVD in-
creases and decreases with m. The probability that the reserved options will not
be exercised increases with an increase in CVD, thus the supplier is less willing to
chance higher production levels. An increase in m makes selling goods to the spot
market less attractive, thus the suppliers in both the centralized and decentralized
systems restrict the production quantity to the amount that minimizes the loss
from selling to the spot market, which leads to the decrease in QCP − Q.
2.6.4 Comparison between Case I and Case II, Uncon-
strained Capacity.
Although the contract improves system performance when the supplier is either
competitive or non-competitive, there are diﬀerences between the Case I and Case
II contract mechanisms and performance.
In Case I, the parameter m has the largest eﬀect on the supply chain and the
performance of both parties, whereas CVD aﬀects the performance of the contract38
most greatly in Case II. This comes as no surprise when viewed from the perspective
of the supplier, who is the Stackelberg leader that controls the contract terms
and who must sell into the spot market if the manufacturer does not exercise her
options. The noncompetitive Case II supplier must fervently avoid the spot market
because any unit sold there generates a loss. And so, demand variability, which
signiﬁcantly aﬀects whether the manufacturer will exercise options at any price,
signiﬁcantly aﬀects how the supplier sets the contract prices. Demand variability
is much less an issue for the competitive supplier in Case I who can proﬁtably sell
in the spot market, and safely encourage the manufacturer to purchase a greater
number of options, some of which are likely not to be exercised. The supplier
will produce up to its capacity, and its goal is simply to sell as many units to the
manufacturer as possible in order to avoid the spot market margin. Thus m most
aﬀects the supplier’s actions in this case.
Both the supplier and the manufacturer beneﬁt from the contract, although
the manufacturer beneﬁts to a lesser degree. For the manufacturer in Case I,
the value of the relative cost savings θ increases with the value of m, and when
combined with high demand and price variability, can be larger than 10%; in Case
II, the additional gains are very low (always below 1%) so that the contract is of
little value to the manufacturer. It follows that the manufacturer would prefer a
competitive supplier to a noncompetitive one.
Total price P decreases in m in Case I, and increases (very slightly) in m in
Case II. Reservation price s decreases in m in Case I, and increases in m in Case
II, whereas the exercise price g decreases in m in both Cases I and II, although
almost imperceptibly so in Case I. As a consequence, the reservation quantity Q∗
increases in m in Case I and decreases in Case II. As the spot market becomes more39
unattractive to the Case II supplier as m increases, the supplier’s actions simul-
taneously reduce both the number of options purchased (the supplier increases s)
and the chance of selling to the spot market (the supplier decreases g). Conversely,
the Case I competitive supplier encourages a greater number of options to be pur-
chased while only marginally reducing the probability of sale to the spot market
by decreasing g, which the noncompetitive supplier does more aggressively.
Both competitive and noncompetitive suppliers keep the exercise price g suﬃ-
ciently low to guarantee that the probability that the spot price exceeds g is small
(H(g) is small), but as the demand variability increases so too does g. The reser-
vation price s conversely decreases in CVD in both cases. This behavior is more
noticeable in Case I where the competitive supplier can more freely encourage the
manufacturer to purchase a greater number of options because the downside of the
spot market is not as great as for the noncompetitive supplier.
In summary, the following inequalities hold for Case I and Case II scenarios in
which m,CVSP and CVD are held constant:
sII > sI,
gII < gI,
PII > PI,
Q
∗
II < Q
∗
I,
Q
∗
IIsII > Q
∗
IsI,
E[Q
∗
IIsII + gIIqII] < E[Q
∗
IsI + gIqI],
where the last line represents the expected revenue that the supplier receives from
the manufacturer.40
2.6.5 Results: Limited Supplier’s Capacity in Case I
The contract again improves the performance of the decentralized system when the
supplier’s capacity is limited. In fact, the contract helps to attain the centralized
solution when the capacity is severely constrained, although the contract is not
practically incentive compatible for the manufacturer in this case.
The system proﬁt with the contract is equal to that of the centralized system
when the supplier’s capacity K is below D, because QCP = QP = Q = K,s = PS
and H(g) = 0, and thus according to (3.3) ∆πC−DC = 0. The supplier and the
manufacturer can contract on the supplier’s full capacity with certainty in this
case. The supplier charges P = PS when K ≤ D however, and so this contract
does not provide any value for the manufacturer. The value of ∆πC−DC increases
with K until the capacity level reaches Q∗, the optimal reservation level in the non-
capacitated problem, and does not change after that. Figure 2.2 shows how the
contract eﬀectiveness ρ changes depending on the value of the supplier’s capacity
K.
The manufacturer’s relative cost savings θ is zero whenever K ≤ D and in-
creases for D ≤ K ≤ Q∗. Thus the supplier must have suﬃcient capacity in order
for a contract to be incentive compatible for the manufacturer. Figure 2.3 shows
how θ depends on the value of the capacity K.
The supplier’s additional proﬁt increases as K increases, while P decreases and
so too does the supplier’s expected revenue per unit sold to the manufacturer.
Thus, even though the supplier’s additional proﬁt generated by the contract is
non-decreasing in K, the supplier’s relative proﬁt increase κ is non-increasing in
K (see Figure 2.4).41
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Figure 2.2: The Contract Eﬀectiveness, ρ, [ 1 (CVSP = 0.05, CVD = 0.4, m =
0.3PS); 2 (CVSP = 0.4, CVD = 0.4, m = 0.3PS); 3 (CVSP = 0.05, CVD = 0.05,
m = 0.1PS).].42
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Figure 2.3: Manufacturer’s relative cost savings, θ, [1 (CVSP = 0.05, CVD = 0.4,
m = 0.3PS);2 (CVSP = 0.4, CVD = 0.4, m = 0.3PS); 3 (CVSP = 0.05, CVD = 0.05,
m = 0.1PS).].43
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Figure 2.4: Supplier’s relative proﬁt increase, κ, [1 (CVSP = 0.05, CVD = 0.4,
m = 0.3PS); 2 (CVSP = 0.4, CVD = 0.4, m = 0.3PS); 3 (CVSP = 0.05, CVD = 0.05,
m = 0.1PS).].44
2.7 Extensions
2.7.1 Penalty Cost
In this section we relax the assumption that the manufacturer must satisfy all
demand in full. We assume that the manufacturer pays a penalty p for each unit
that her delivered quantity falls short of the quantity ordered by her customer and
receives a revenue a for each unit delivered. (Forced compliance can be viewed
as the case with p = ∞.) The main diﬀerence from the previous analysis is that
the supplier will only buy the product or service if the exercise price does not
exceed (p + a), the loss for each unit she is short from the amount demanded by
her customer.
In this case, the optimal quantity reserved by the manufacturer is
F(Q
∗) = 1 −
s
LH(g) −
R ∞
p+a(PS − (p + a))h(PS)dPS
, (2.10)
if g < p + a, otherwise there is no contract.
Note the additional term in the denominator of (2.10) that is not present in the
forced compliance case that represents lost revenue when the spot market price is
high. It follows that the optimal reservation quantity is increasing in p:
∂Q∗
∂p
=
s(1 − H(p + a))
f(Q∗)

LH(g) −
R ∞
p+a(PS − (p + a))h(PS)dPS
2 > 0.
It also follows from (2.10) that the contract quantity 0 < Q < ∞ if
Z p+a
g
PSh(PS)dPS +
Z ∞
p+a
(p + a)dH − g(1 − H(g)) > s.
Thus the reservation price should be smaller than the expected savings from using
contract rather than buying directly from the spot market.45
It is easy to verify in this setting that all the previous results in Propositions 3, 4
and 6 hold, and for the optimal reservation price we have the following expressions:
1. Case I. If PS − m − b ≥ 0, s is the solution of
Q
∗ −
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS −
R ∞
p+a(PS − (p + a))h(PS)dPS

LH(g) −
R ∞
p+a(PS − (p + a))h(PS)dPS

rF(Q∗)
= 0. (2.11)
2. Case II. If PS − m − b < 0, s is the solution of
Q
∗ −
1
rF(Q∗)
·
 
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS −
R ∞
p+a(PS − (p + a))h(PS)dPS
LH(g) −
R ∞
p+a(PS − (p + a))h(PS)dPS
−
b + m − PS
s
= 0. (2.12)
In this setting, for certain (low) values of p + a the supplier cannot oﬀer the
manufacturer a contract that is incentive compatible for both players. For example,
from (2.11) or (2.12) it follows that there is no contract if
m
Z ∞
g
h(PS)dPS −
Z ∞
p+a
(PS − (p + a))h(PS)dPS < 0 ⇒
Z ∞
p+a
(PS − (p + a))h(PS)dPS > m. (2.13)
This provides us with a lower bound on the value of p+a, below which a contract
for options is not possible. Rewrite (2.13) as
P S − m >
Z p+a
0
PSh(PS)dPS +
Z ∞
p+a
(p + a)h(PS)dPS.
Thus the supplier does not oﬀer a contract if the expected proﬁt he can receive
form selling directly to the spot market exceeds the expected price manufacturer
pays when she buys on the spot market. The right-hand side of the inquality
represents the highest price the manufacturer is willing to pay to the supplier,
thus the supplier can motivate the manufacturer to sign the contract only if he46
oﬀers a lower price, but supplier will never do that since selling directly to the spot
market is more proﬁtable.
If globally optimal contract parameters exist, then the results of Proposition 7
(restricted supplier’s capacity) hold again in this case. When the manufacturer is
unable to reserve a globally optimal quantity due to the insuﬃcient capacity, then
the supplier will oﬀer her (s,g) as deﬁned by
(1 − mrH(gK0))
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
Kf(D)dD

− K(1 − F(K)) = 0, (2.14)
and
sK0 = LH(gK)(1 − F(K)) −
Z ∞
p+a
(PS − (p + a))h(PS)dPS. (2.15)
2.7.2 Spot Market Margin
It is straightforward to show that the results of Section 2.4 hold if m is a non-
decreasing function of PS. For example, if m is a ﬁxed percentage of the current
spot price PS then our analytical results are still valid.
2.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the design of an optimal contract for options in the
presence of a spot market. We modeled our problem as a two-stage Stackelberg
game in which a supplier is the leader. We showed that the manufacturer’s cost
function is convex and provided a closed-form expression for the optimal reservation
quantity. We provided nonrestrictive conditions under which the supplier’s proﬁt
function is unimodal in the forward and exercise prices.
We demonstrated, using centralized and decentralized cases as benchmarks,
that while the contract signiﬁcantly improved the system overall performance,47
it could not guarantee total channel coordination. We showed nonetheless that
the contract always brings value into the supply chain and can decrease the gap
between centralized and decentralized system proﬁt by as much as 99%. The
supplier, who is the leader, beneﬁts most from the contract, but is unable to extract
all the additional proﬁt from the channel. A supplier must be competitive and
have suﬃcient capacity in order for a contract to be incentive compatible for the
manufacturer. A noncompetitive supplier sets prices that minimize its exposure to
the unattractive spot market, and thus oﬀers a high price and insuﬃcient quantity
to the manufacturer. Even if competitive, a supplier with insuﬃcient capacity will
not oﬀer the manufacturer an attractive price.
With a competitive supplier of suﬃcient capacity, the contract is most attrac-
tive when the spot market margin is large, and allows the spot market to be
circumvented. In this circumstance the supplier (the leader) improves his proﬁts
by a greater percentage than does the manufacturer reduce her cost. The manufac-
turer can still reduce her cost signiﬁcantly when spot price variability and demand
uncertainty are high. In fact, the percentage improvement in each party’s position
is comparable under high CV of both spot price and demand and large m — these
are perhaps the most viable contract conditions when both parties beneﬁt greatly
and are motivated to enter into a contract.
We can succinctly summarize the optimal strategy for the competitive supplier,
who is in a position to oﬀer an incentive compatible contract to the manufacturer.
That is, the exercise price should be set suﬃciently low to virtually guarantee that
the manufacturer will exercise the options and the reservation prices should be set
to balance the trade-oﬀ between immediate revenues (sQ) and the future revenues
(gq+(QP −q)(PS−m)). If the spot price margin is small, then immediate revenue48
dominates the decision. If the spot market margin is large, then the reservation
price is set low to encourage a large number of options to be purchased and the
opportunity to avoid the spot market and its requisite margin maximized.
One possible extension to the problem is designing a contract mechanism that
leads to the system eﬃciency. Another extension is to derive an optimal contract
for a similar problem with multiple periods in which either the supplier or the
buyer can store goods between periods for which a holding cost would be incurred.
A capacity-constrained supplier might ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to store goods not sold to
the manufacturer in one period for sale in the next period. A manufacturer might
ﬁnd some inventory holding cost preferable to possibly high contract or spot prices
in the next period.Chapter 3
Channel Coordination with a Spot
Market
3.1 Introduction
Spot markets often exist for commodity goods and can help to mitigate the eﬀect
of uncertain demand and supply. For example, Shell purchased styrene on the
spot market to mitigate the eﬀect of an unplanned production outage in February
2002 (Cage 2002). Relying exclusively on spot markets rather than contractual
relationships, however, may reduce proﬁts, especially when market prices ﬂuctuate
signiﬁcantly. For example, the proﬁtability of many U.S. steel-consuming compa-
nies suﬀered from a 40% jump in steel prices that resulted from a new tariﬀ on
steel imports that was imposed in March 2002 (see knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu
2003a). Similarly, the margins of many small trucking companies were squeezed
this past year by a 23% increase in retail diesel prices combined with stagnant
transportation prices — many of these companies were forced out of business alto-
gether (see knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu 2003b). Long term contracts, however,
provide protection from volatile spot prices. For example, many large automobile
companies were protected from the recent surge in spot steel prices by long-term
contracts with steelmakers. In this paper we study the optimal balance of con-
tractual relationships and use of the spot market and, in particular, how contracts
and the spot market can be used together to coordinate the supply chain.
We consider a simple one-period model with a supply chain that consists of a
supplier and a manufacturer who engage in a contract for options for an intermedi-
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ate good. The supplier produces the intermediate good, which the manufacturer
transforms into another product that is used downstream in the supply chain. We
assume that the supplier can sell its excess production of the intermediate good to
the spot market and that the manufacturer can buy the intermediate good from
the spot market if the contracted quantity is insuﬃcient or if the spot market price
is preferable to the exercise price oﬀered by the supplier. For clarity of exposition
we will assume that the manufacturer must satisfy all the demand from his cus-
tomer in full. This assumption can be relaxed to the case when the manufacturer
pays a penalty cost for unsatisﬁed demand, in which case the intuition that we
draw from the analysis of this model applies.
We consider three diﬀerent mechanisms that coordinate the channel in this
setting. In the ﬁrst, we allow the manufacturer to choose the contract prices. In
the second mechanism, we consider the contract for options where the reservation
price is a function of the contracted capacity, i.e., a quantity discount contract. In
the third mechanism, we allow for partial renegotiation of the contract parameters
after the demand and the spot price are realized. When the manufacturer is the
leader, we show an equivalence between the optimal contract parameters in our
model and a classic result by Hirshleifer (1956) in a deterministic setting. We also
show how each coordinating mechanism aﬀects the allocation of the proﬁts between
the supplier and the manufacturer and give some insight into when each mecha-
nism is most appropriate. Most notably though, we ﬁnd that the renegotiation
dominates the other two coordination mechanisms. First, renegotiation is robust
— we show that it coordinates the channel even under information asymmetry.
Second, renegotiation induces a more equitable sharing of the contract beneﬁts
than the other mechanisms.51
There is a large literature on contracting and supply chain coordination, which
is reviewed by Cachon (2002). Of this literature, a number of papers analyze con-
tracts between suppliers and buyers in the presence of spot markets. One stream
of research has been mainly concerned with ﬁnding a Nash Equilibrium strategy
of the players and has not, in general, focused on the channel coordination. Wu
et al. (2002) and Spinler et al. (2002) consider an optimal contract for options
in the presence of a spot market when the supplier is the leader. Both papers
assume that demand is price dependent and endogenous. Wu et al. assume de-
terministic demand while Spinler et al. assume stochastic demand and production
costs. Golovachkina and Bradley (2002) analyze a similar model with exogenous
price-independent demand. They show that in this case when the supplier is a
Stackelberg leader the contract for options does not coordinate the channel. The
basic model we present here is similar the model in Golovachkina and Bradley
(2002), but we concentrate primarily on the mechanisms that lead to the channel
coordination while Golovachkina and Bradley (2002) were mostly concerned with
ﬁnding optimal parameters for the contract for options that in many cases do not
coordinate the channel.
Another stream of research demonstrates how a spot market can complement
the contract between a supplier and a manufacturer and improve the performance
in a decentralized supply chain, but again does not deal with achieving of channel
coordination. Araman et al. (2001) analyze a model with a spot market in which
the supplier’s predetermined pricing scheme depends on both the amount of ca-
pacity reserved by the buyer and the quantity of goods it ultimately purchases.
The spot market price is a function of the demand in this model. Contrary to
our model, the buyer must always purchase ﬁrst from the supplier up to the re-52
served capacity, and only then can go to the spot market to satisfy the remaining
demand. The authors numerically compute the optimal mix between these two
channels. Erhun et al. (2000) consider a stylized model in a deterministic environ-
ment. They show that the supplier and the manufacturer can use spot markets to
strategic advantage even when there is no uncertainty.
One of the issues we deal with in this paper is contract renegotiation, which is
closely related to incomplete contracting. There are number of papers in economics
literature devoted to this subject. Hart and Moore (1988) consider a model in
which two parties are forced to sign an incomplete contract due to their inability to
describe all possible future states of the world and later renegotiate upon realization
of the future state. The authors show that the inability to prevent renegotiation
results in under-investment by the agents. Laﬀont and Tirole (1990) consider
renegotiation when the buyer and supplier have asymmetric information. Noldeke
and Schmidt (1995) show that no renegotiation is necessary to achieve coordination
when the agents sign a simple option contract, which gives the seller the right
but not the obligation to deliver the good at the certain price. Aghion et al.
(1994) show that coordination can be achieved when the initial contract speciﬁes
default options if renegotiation breaks down, and assigns all bargaining power
in renegotiation to either buyer or the supplier. We add to this literature by
considering a model with a spot market and showing how renegotiation improves
the performance of the contract for options in this case.
Renegotiation is very important in practice. A recent survey of logistics man-
agers, for example, revealed that renegotiating shipping rates was a dominant
strategy in companies eﬀorts to reduce costs in 2002 (see The Controller’s Report
(Jan. 2003)). Yet, to the best of our knowledge Plambeck and Taylor (2002) is53
the only other paper in the supply chain management literature that considers
contract renegotiation. Plambeck and Taylor consider a model with a single sup-
plier and two buyers in which the buyers are allowed to renegotiate the contracted
quantity after demand is observed. Beneﬁt is derived in this system because the
buyers can eﬀectively trade goods when one’s demand is high and other’s is low.
In contrast, we show that the system can beneﬁt from renegotiation even when
the supplier has just one customer. Speciﬁcally, when information asymmetry is
present, anticipating renegotiation allows the supplier to screen the manufacturer
for his true type without sacriﬁcing system eﬃciency.
In a similar vein to renegotiation, Van Mieghem (1999) studies an incomplete
contract between a supplier (subcontractor) and a manufacturer in a two-stage
game where rather than revising contract terms set in the ﬁrst stage, as is done
in renegotiation, the negotiation of some contract terms is left for the second
stage. The channel is coordinated when the subcontractor and manufacturer set a
ﬁxed per-unit transfer price and leave to the second stage the bargaining over the
division of the surplus generated by the contract. Among the diﬀerences in Van
Mieghem’s and our model is that he draws in the capacity decision, whereas we
consider only the production and exchange decisions. In that sense our model takes
a shorter-term perspective because we ﬁx production capacity and analyze the
production and exchange decisions in ﬁner granularity — i.e., whereas production
and exchange decisions are made simultaneously after demand is observed in Van
Mieghem’s model, production decisions are made in the ﬁrst stage in our model
before demand is realized and exchange takes place in the second stage. Moreover,
we assume that all contract parameters are speciﬁed before uncertainty of demand
is resolved. Finally, a key feature of our model is the presence of the spot market,54
which is absent in Van Mieghem’s model.
In Section 4.3 we describe our general model. In Section 3.3 we describe a
centralized system and a decentralized system without a contract that we use
as benchmarks. In Section 3.4 we show how the channel can be coordinated
when the manufacturer is the leader. In Section 3.5 we show that the supply
chain can be coordinated with a quantity discount contract. In Section 3.6 we
show how coordination can be achieved with renegotiation and demonstrate how
renegotiation coordinates the channel even if the manufacturer and the supplier
have asymmetric information about demand. We present our conclusions in Section
3.7.
3.2 The Model
We consider a single-period, two-stage problem with a single supplier and single
manufacturer. The supplier provides a commodity to the manufacturer that it
uses to produce a good for use in downstream supply chain links. Without loss
of generality, we assume that one unit of the intermediate commodity is required
for each unit of the manufacturer’s product. We assume that the supplier has a
capacity K and pays b for each unit she produces. (See Table 3.1 for a complete
list of notation.) The manufacturer faces a stochastic demand D, with cumulative
distribution function F(.), p.d.f. f(.) and expected value D. We assume that the
price paid by the manufacturer for the commodity is independent of the demand
for the good he produces. This is the case, for example, when the manufacturer
produces a subassembly or if the manufacturer sells to a more powerful customer
that can limit the extent to which the manufacturer can pass forward its costs. We
also assume that neither the supplier nor the buyer has any perceptible eﬀect on55
the spot price for the commodity because they represent just a small fraction of the
whole market. We assume that the quantity of goods desired by the manufacturer
is always available on the spot market at some stochastic price PS with cumulative
distribution H(.), p.d.f. h(.) and expected value P S. Given the structure of the
problem, we assume that D ≥ 0 and PS ≥ 0. We assume that there is a ﬁxed
margin m per unit that the spot market extracts in order to clear the market.
We assume this simple form for the spot market margin for clarity of exposition
although we can easily extend our results to more general forms.
-
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Figure 3.1: Event Timeline
We model our problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game (see Figure 4.1), where
either party (supplier or manufacturer) can be the leader. At the beginning of
the ﬁrst stage, the leader announces the contract parameters (s,g), where s is a
reservation price per unit the manufacturer pays to have the product available to
him and g is a per-unit exercise price that the manufacturer pays for each unit
delivered in stage 2. The follower then decides how much capacity Q is reserved56
Table 3.1: Notation
K - supplier’s capacity
b - production cost per unit
m - spot market margin per unit
s - reservation price per option
g - exercise price per option
Q - number of options purchased by manufacturer
q - number of options exercised
qS - number of units purchased on the spot market
QP - supplier’s production quantity
PS - spot market price
D - demand random variable
F(.) - demand c.d.f.
f(.) - demand p.d.f.
H(.) - spot price c.d.f.
h(.) - spot price p.d.f.
f PS - realization of the spot price random variable
e D - realization of the demand random variable
PS - expected spot market price
D - expected demand
for the manufacturer at the given prices s and g. After the contract parameters
s,g, and Q are set, the supplier chooses her production quantity QP assuming
that the supplier must produce at least as much as the manufacturer has reserved
(QP ≥ Q).57
At the beginning of the second stage the demand D and the spot price PS are
realized, after which the manufacturer decides how much to order from the supplier
q, and how much to buy on the spot market qS. The manufacturer goes to the
spot market if either the contracted quantity is insuﬃcient to satisfy his demand
or if the spot market price is lower than the exercise price charged by the supplier,
i.e., if e PS < g. After the manufacturer’s order is ﬁlled, we assume that the supplier
can sell all her excess inventory to the spot market at the current price e PS minus
commission m, which may or may not be proﬁtable.
3.3 Centralized and Decentralized Systems
In order to demonstrate how to coordinate the channel we need to introduce a
centralized system in which a single decision-maker optimizes the entire supply
chain. There are no transfer prices in the centralized system and everything that
the supplier produces goes ﬁrst to the manufacturer to satisfy demand. The re-
maining goods (if any) are sold to the spot market. Any unmet demand is satisﬁed
through the spot market.
The centralized decision-maker solves the problem:
max
QCP
π
T
C = ED,PS{(PS − m)(QCP − D)
+ − PS(D − QCP)
+ − QCPb}
subject to: QCP ≤ K,
where QCP is the supplier’s production quantity in the centralized system. Here
we use subscript C to refer to the centralized system and superscript T to refer to
the whole system.
The objective function can be rewritten as
π
T
C = (PS−m−b)QCP−P SD+m
Z QCP
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
QCP
QCPf(D)dD

, (3.1)58
which is a newsvendor problem. Let us denote as b QCP the solution of
F(b QCP) =
PS − b
m
.
Then the optimal centralized production quantity is
Q
∗
CP =

    
    
b QCP if 0 ≤
PS−b
m ≤ 1 and b QCP ≤ K,
K if
PS−b
m > 1 or b QCP > K,
0 if
PS−b
m < 0.
(3.2)
The following expression represents the diﬀerence between the proﬁts in the
centralized system and the decentralized system with the contract for options
(speciﬁed by s,g, and Q) (see Golovachkina and Bradley 2002):
4π
T
C−DC = (Q
∗
CP − QP)(PS − b − m) − m(1 − H(g
∗)) (3.3)
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

+ m
 Z Q∗
CP
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
CP
Q
∗
CPf(D)dD
!
.
Thus, to coordinate the supply chain we want to ﬁnd mechanisms that result in
∆πT
C−DC = 0.
In order to assess the value of the contract for each player we introduce the
decentralized system without a contract (we will use subscript DNC to denote
this system). In this case both the supplier and the manufacturer go directly to
the spot market and do not engage in any transactions with each other.
The manufacturer’s expected costs in this case are
CDNC = P SD.
The supplier’s expected proﬁt is
πDNC = K(P S − m − b), when P S − m − b ≥ 0,
πDNC = 0, when P S − m − b < 0.59
Thus, the contract will be incentive compatible for the players if the manufacturer’s
costs with a contract, C, satisﬁes C ≤ CDNC and the supplier’s proﬁt with a
contract, π, satisﬁes π ≥ πDNC.
3.4 Channel Coordination when the Manufacturer is the
Leader
In this section we show how the supply chain can be coordinated when the manu-
facturer is the leader and chooses contract prices (s,g). The supplier in this case
decides how many units QP she should produce and how many options Q the man-
ufacturer can reserve at the announced prices. The supplier’s ﬁrst-stage problem
is therefore
max
Q,QP
π(Q,QP) = ED,PS[−QPb + sQ + (PS − m)(QP − q) + gq] (S1)
subject to: 0 ≤ Q ≤ QP ≤ K.
In anticipation of the supplier’s solution to Problem S1, the manufacturer selects
a pair (s,g) in the ﬁrst stage that minimizes his expected costs:
min
s,g C(s,g) = ED,PS[PS(D − q) + sQ + gq] (M1)
subject to: s ≥ 0,g ≥ 0.
Proposition 8 Suppose P S − m − b ≥ 0, then
1. The manufacturer oﬀers
s = (PS − m)

1
K
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

, (3.4)
g = 0,60
and the supplier sets
Q = K.
2. The supply chain is coordinated.
3. The supplier receives no beneﬁt from this contract and the manufacturer’s
cost savings are
∆C = CDNC − C = m
Z K
0
Df(D)dD + K
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

. (3.5)
Proof. We rewrite the supplier’s objective function as
π(Q,QP) = (PS − m − b)QP + sQ
−
Z ∞
g
(PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS
Z Q
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(D)dD

.
It is straightforward to see that when PS − m − b ≥ 0, then QP = K.
The ﬁrst derivative of π(Q,QP) is
∂π
∂Q
= s − (1 − F(Q))
Z ∞
g
(PS − g − m)h(PS)dPS,
and the second derivative is
∂2π
∂Q2 = f(Q)
Z ∞
g
(PS − g − m)h(PS)dPS.
We see that if
R ∞
g (PS−g−m)h(PS)dPS ≥ 0, then the supplier’s objective function
is convex in Q and thus the optimal Q∗ is equal to either K or 0.
If
R ∞
g (PS − g − m)h(PS)dPS < 0, the supplier’s objective function is concave.
But in this case ∂π
∂Q > 0 and thus the optimal Q∗ = K .61
Now consider the manufacturer’s problem.
min
s,g C(s,g) = PS · D + sK−
Z ∞
g
(PS − g)h(PS)dPS·
Z K
0
Df(D)dD + K
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

s.t. π(K,K) ≥ π(0,K)
s ≥ 0,g ≥ 0,
where the ﬁrst constraint is an incentive constraint for the supplier to set the order
quantity above zero.
The above problem can be rewritten as
min
s,g C(s,g) = PS · D + sK −
Z ∞
g
(PS − g)h(PS)dPS
Z K
0
Df(D)dD + K
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

s.t. s −
Z ∞
g
(PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS

1
K
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

≥ 0
s ≥ 0,g ≥ 0.
After taking derivatives we observe that
∂C
∂s
= K > 0,
∂C
∂g
= (1 − H(g))
Z K
0
Df(D)dD + K
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

> 0.
The objective function is strictly increasing in both s and g, and thus the optimal
point is a boundary point. The feasibility region for this problem is deﬁned by
s ≥
Z ∞
g
(PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS

1
K
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

,(3.6)
s ≥ 0,g ≥ 0.
If
R ∞
g (PS −g −m)h(PS)dPS < 0, then from (3.6) follows that s = 0 and g = 0
which is equivalent to no contract case.62
If
R ∞
g (PS − g − m)h(PS)dPS ≥ 0, then inequality s ≥ 0 is redundant and we
have
s ≥
Z ∞
g
(PS − m − g)h(PS)dPS

1
K
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

,(3.7)
g ≥ 0,
Z ∞
g
(PS − g − m)h(PS)dPS ≥ 0,
so that there are two possible combinations for the optimal solution, which we
denote with the appropriate subscripts.
Suppose s1 = 0. Then from (3.7) follows that g1 > 0 and is such that
Z ∞
g1
(PS − m − g1)h(PS)dPS = 0.
Suppose g2 = 0. Then from (3.7) follows that
s2 = (PS − m)

1
K
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

.
We determine the optimal solution by comparing the values of the objective
function in each one.
C1(s1,g1) = PS · D − m
Z ∞
g1
h(PS)dPS
Z K
0
Df(D)dD + K
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

,
and
C2(s2,g2) = PS · D − m
Z K
0
Df(D)dD + K
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

.
Because g1 > 0, we conclude that C1(s1,g1) > C2(s2,g2) and thus
s
∗ = (PS − m)

1
K
Z K
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

,
g
∗ = 0,
Q
∗ = Q
∗
P = K.
The corresponding manufacturer’s cost savings under (s∗,g∗) in comparison
with no-contract situation in this case is
∆C = CDNC − C = m(
Z K
0
Df(D)dD + K
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD) > 0,63
which implies that the contact is always incentive compatible for the manufacturer.
In this case the diﬀerence of the proﬁts between centralized and decentralized
systems is
∆π
T
C−DC = 0.
Thus, the channel coordination is achieved.
This contract prices in (3.4) are identical to the classic result by Hirshleifer
(1956), who shows in a deterministic setting that system coordination is attained
only when the transfer price for an intermediate good is equal to the competitive
market price. In our stochastic setting, Hirshleifer’s result holds in expectation.
That is, the expected unit price paid by the manufacturer is equal to the supplier’s
expected unit revenue from selling to the spot market, P S − m. Thus, although
the supply chain is coordinated when the manufacturer is the leader, the supplier’s
expected additional proﬁt is zero so that a risk neutral supplier has no incentive
to sign this contract. However, a risk averse supplier would consider this contract
because it eliminates proﬁt variability due to the ﬂuctuating spot market price for
the quantity of goods sold to the manufacturer.
The comparison of this result with the one presented in Golovachkina and
Bradley (2002) shows that whether the channel is coordinated and whether the
contract beneﬁts are distributed equitably depend on who is the leader. While
the channel is not coordinated when the supplier is the leader, the channel is co-
ordinated when the manufacturer is the leader. We conclude that when supply
chain coordination is important, the leadership should be given to the downstream
player because he is better able to set the transfer prices at the optimal level. Co-
ordinating the channel by giving leadership to the manufacturer, however, results
in a less equitable sharing of the contract beneﬁts. When the supplier leads, it64
receives a majority of the contract beneﬁts, but still the manufacturer receives
some beneﬁt. When the manufacturer leads, it receives all the contract beneﬁts
because it is capable of extracting all the welfare from the system and in doing so
giving the supplier (in expectation) a price no greater than she would have received
from the spot market, P S − m. While unfortunate for the supplier this transfer
price is eﬃcient for the supply chain. Of course, barring a risk averse supplier,
the practical implementation when the manufacturer leads will require a transfer
payment from the manufacturer to motivate the supplier to sign this contract.
For our next result we use the following deﬁnition (Shaked and Shanthikumar
1994).
Deﬁnition. For two random variables D1 and D2, we say that D1 is smaller than
D2 in convex order, and write D1 ≤cx D2, if E[φ(D1)] ≤ E[φ(D2)] for all convex
functions φ, provided the expectations exist.
Practically, D1 ≤cx D2 means that the random variable D2 is more variable
than D1.
Proposition 9 The following results hold:
1. The manufacturer’s expected cost is decreasing in m and in K.
2. The type of the spot price distribution does not aﬀect the manufacturer’s
expected cost (only the expected spot price matters).
3. Suppose Di, for i = 1,2 are two random variables such that D1 ≤cx D2. If
Ci are corresponding expected costs of the manufacturer, then C1 ≤ C2.
Proof. The manufacturer’s expected costs with the contract are equal to
C = P SD − m
Z K
0
Df(D)dD + K
Z ∞
K
f(D)dD

.65
The ﬁrst part of the Proposition follow directly from diﬀerentiating C with respect
to m and K. The second part follows directly from (3.5).
To show that the third part holds we rewrite the manufacturer’s expected costs
C = ED[P SD − mmin(D,K)].
Deﬁne φ(D) = P SD − mmin(D,K), which is convex in D. Thus,
C1 = ED[P SD1 − mmin(D1,K)] ≤ ED[P SD2 − mmin(D2,K)] = C2.
As the margin increases, the supplier is less willing to sell to the spot market
and, thus, the manufacturer is able to strike a better deal with her. The manufac-
turer’s costs decrease in m as a result. When the supplier’s capacity increases, the
manufacturer, who according to this contract reserves all K units, pays a lower
price per each unit. At the same time, a higher reservation quantity implies a lower
probability that the manufacturer will also buy from the spot market. Thus, the
manufacturer wins twice from a larger K, which results in lower costs. The second
part of proposition says that the manufacturer is on average not aﬀected by the
changes in the spot price distributions as long as the expected spot price remains
the same. The third part of the proposition implies that the manufacturer with a
less variable demand has lower costs with this contract. Figure 3.2 demonstrates
the results presented in Proposition 9.
3.5 Channel Coordination with Quantity Discounts
In this section we show how the supply chain can be coordinated using the quantity
discount mechanism. It is known that the quantity discount contract is often able66
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to coordinate the channel when other contracts fail (see, for example, Cachon
2002). We ﬁrst consider the case when the supplier is the leader.
Proposition 10 If the supplier is the leader, the following contract with s decreas-
ing in Q coordinates the channel:
s(Q) =
P S
Q
Z Q
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(D)dD

,
g = 0.
The supplier will extract all beneﬁts from this contract and the manufacturer will
have zero cost savings.
Proof. The result can be easily veriﬁed. We substitute given (s,g) in the
manufacturer’s cost function. The resulting
C = P SD
thus the manufacturer’s cost savings are zero for any quantity he reserves from the
supplier.
The supplier’s proﬁt in this case is
π = (P S − m − b)QP + m
Z Q
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(D)dD

= π
T
C + P SD, when Q = QP = QCP.
Since the centralized system is the best the supplier can do, we conclude that the
supplier wants the manufacturer to reserve Q = QCP, which the manufacturer
does.
The resulting system’s proﬁt is
π
T = π
T
C ,68
and, thus, the system is coordinated.
This contract allows for the supply channel coordination but leaves the manu-
facturer with zero beneﬁts.
Now we assume that the manufacturer is the leader and sets the prices.
Proposition 11 Suppose the manufacturer is the leader. Then the following con-
tract with s decreasing in Q coordinates the channel.
If P S − m − b ≥ 0, then
s(Q) =
(P S − m)
Q
Z Q
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(D)dD

,
g = 0.
If P S − m − b < 0, then
s(Q) =
(P S − m)
Q
Z Q
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(D)dD

+ b + m − P S,
g = 0.
The manufacturer extracts all beneﬁts from this contract and the supplier is left
with zero beneﬁt.
Proof. We substitute given values of (s,g) into the supplier’s proﬁt function.
The resulting proﬁt is
if P S − m − b ≥ 0, then π = QP(P S − m − b),
if P S − m − b < 0, then π = 0.
Thus, the supplier’s proﬁt does not depend on the quantity reserved by the man-
ufacturer.
The manufacturer’s costs are
C = P SD − m
Z Q
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(D)dD

− (PS − m − b)Q · 1{PS−m−b<0}69
where 1{PS−m−b<0} is an indicator function, which is equal to one if the subscript
is true and zero otherwise. Comparison of this expression with (3.1) and (3.2)
shows that the manufacturer’s costs are minimized when Q = QCP. The resulting
system’s proﬁt is
π
T = π
T
C
and the channel is coordinated.
It follows from Propositions 10 and 11 that the quantity discount contract coor-
dinates the channel but gives the follower no beneﬁt. Moreover, the leader oﬀers a
price schedule such that the follower’s beneﬁt is invariant of the reservation quan-
tity chosen. Thus, besides the inequitable sharing of beneﬁts, another practical
implementation issue arises. The leader must signal to the follower what reser-
vation quantity to choose by oﬀering an additional (very small) transfer payment
when Q = Q∗
CP.
When the manufacturer is the leader and the supplier can sell proﬁtably to the
spot market, P S −m−b ≥ 0, the actual prices that the manufacturer pays to the
supplier are the same as with the contract for options when the manufacturer is
the leader in (3.4) because the supplier is induced to choose a reservation quantity
equal to its capacity, Q = K.
It is interesting to note from Proposition 11 that when P S −m−b < 0 and the
supplier cannot sell proﬁtably to the spot market, the price that the manufacturer
pays, s, compensates the supplier for expected loss from selling to the spot market:
s =
(P S − m)
Q
Z Q
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(D)dD

+ b + m − P S
≥ b + m − P S.70
At the same time, the price that the manufacturer pays to the supplier for each
unit can be below the supplier’s production cost,
s =
(P S − m)
Q
Z Q
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(D)dD

+ b + m − P S
≤
(P S − m)
Q
Q + b + m − P S
= b.
Therefore, with this contract, the manufacturer compensates the supplier for the
loss she will incur if she sells goods to the spot market, but he does not pay the
supplier enough to compensate her for the production costs. Thus, this contract
arrangement is not tenable for the supplier.
3.6 Channel Coordination with Renegotiation
In this section we show how channel coordination can be achieved if the manufac-
turer and the supplier are allowed to renegotiate the parameters of the contract
after the demand and the spot price are observed. We, ﬁrst, use the contract for
options when the supplier is the leader as a basis for this analysis because both the
supplier and manufacturer beneﬁt from that contract, although it does not coordi-
nate the channel. With renegotiation we assume that if the spot market price falls
below the exercise price, then the supplier and the manufacturer can renegotiate
the exercise price to be equal to the spot price, g = f PS, so that the manufacturer
is still motivated to purchase from the supplier, and the supplier can avoid paying
m per unit to the spot market to sell its goods. If manufacturer’s demand exceeds
the quantity reserved from the supplier, then we allow the manufacturer to buy an
additional quantity at the current spot price f PS up to the quantity of goods that
the supplier has left over. Again, the supplier can avoid the costs of selling to the71
spot market.
In this case the supplier’s expected proﬁt is
π(QP,s,g) = ED,PS[sQ
∗ + PS · min(QP − q
∗,D − q
∗) (3.8)
+ gq
∗ + (PS − m)(QP − D)
+ − QPb],
and the manufacturer’s expected costs are
C(Q) = ED,PS[PS(D − q
∗) + sQ + gq
∗], (3.9)
so that the total system proﬁt from (3.8) and (3.9) after taking the expectation is
π
T
DC = QP(PS−m−b)−D·PS+m
Z QP
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
QP
QPf(D)dD

. (3.10)
We see that the expected supply chain proﬁt equals the centralized proﬁt πT
DC = πT
C
if the supplier’s production quantity equals the centralized optimal, QP = Q∗
CP.
Notice from (3.10) that the values of s and g do not aﬀect the total system proﬁt
in this case as long as they induce the supplier’s production quantity to equal the
optimal centralized solution, QP = Q∗
CP.
Now we will show that the supplier sets the production quantity optimally (i.e.,
QP = Q∗
CP). The supplier solves:
max π(QP,s,g) = ED,PS[sQ
∗ + PS · min(QP − q
∗,D − q
∗)
+ gq
∗ + (PS − m)(QP − D)
+ − QPb]
s.t. : s ≥ 0,g ≥ 0,QP ≥ Q
∗.
The proﬁt function can be rewritten as
π(QP,s,g) = sQ
∗ + QP(PS − m − b) + m
Z QP
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
QP
QPf(D)dD

− LH(g)
Z Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +
Z ∞
Q∗
Q
∗f(D)dD

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Diﬀerentiating with respect to QP yields
∂π
∂QP
= (PS − m − b) + m(1 − F(QP))
and
∂2π
∂Q2
P
= −mf(QP) < 0.
Thus, the function is strictly concave in QP, and the optimal production quantity
Q∗
P = max(Q,Q∗
CP). Thus, if the reservation quantity is less or equal to the cen-
tralized production quantity, Q ≤ Q∗
CP, then the supplier will produce optimally
for the supply chain, i.e. QP = Q∗
CP. Thus, Q ≤ Q∗
CP is a suﬃcient condition for
supply chain coordination when renegotiation is allowed.
Now we have to ﬁnd (s,g) such that corresponding reservation quantity Q
satisﬁes Q ≤ Q∗
CP and the manufacturer has an incentive to choose the contract
with renegotiation rather than a contract without renegotiation. As shown in
Golovachkina and Bradley (2002), the prices (so,go) in the optimal contract for
options without renegotiation (here we use o to indicate those original optimal
contract parameters without renegotiation) when the supplier is the leader satisfy
this condition because the corresponding reservation quantity satisﬁes Qo ≤ Q∗
CP
due to double marginalization. However, the supplier is the only party who beneﬁts
from renegotiation and the manufacturer is indiﬀerent between renegotiating and
buying directly on the spot market. Therefore, to motivate the manufacturer to
accept this agreement the supplier can, for example, increase the manufacturer’s
cost savings by decreasing either s or g, from so and go, so that the manufacturer
would prefer renegotiation and the corresponding manufacturer’s order quantity
would still satisfy Q ≤ Q∗
CP and lie within the interval [Qo,QCP].
Notice that in this case coordination is achieved under voluntary compliance
from the supplier because her production quantity, QP, is set independently of the73
manufacturer’s reservation quantity. However, coordination can only be achieved
if both the supplier and the manufacturer comply with the terms of the contract
which includes renegotiating at the stage 2. The manufacturer gains nothing from
renegotiating the price or quantity at the later stage unless, contrary to our as-
sumption of a nondiﬀerentiated homogenous commodity, the supplier’s goods are
somehow superior to those on the spot market. (This can, in fact, be the case,
for example, where steel on the spot market might meet the technical content re-
quirements, but be more prone to quality defects such as surface imperfections.)
Barring such diﬀerentiation, and assuming a greedy manufacturer, the supplier
should not expect the manufacturer to renegotiate. Yet, research in organizational
theory shows that such behavior does sometimes occur due to “embeddedness” in
inter-ﬁrm relationships. Uzzi (1997) shows that owners and managers in the posi-
tion of our manufacturer are, in fact, willing to help owners and managers in the
position of our supplier, even at a cost. Embeddedness causes owners and agents of
ﬁrms to occasionally provide consideration in addition to previously agreed upon
terms when unforeseen circumstances compromise the position of the other party,
and is due to interpersonal relationships, trust, and the tacit expectation that such
consideration will ﬂow in both directions. In a word, Uzzi’s work shows that selﬁsh
behavior should not be expected in all instances, and especially where transactions
are at less than arm’s length.
Using (3.10), we can demonstrate numerically that when renegotiation is ex-
pected, coordination can be achieved even if we restrict our attention to a single-
price contract (i.e., a contract with a reservation price s > 0 only and g = 0). As
our numerical examples suggest, the corresponding Qs ≤ Q∗
CP (we use subscript s
for parameters corresponding to the optimal single-price contract), which is suf-74
ﬁcient for the coordination of the channel. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrates the
absolute improvement in system proﬁt, ∆ = πT
C − πT
s , and the relative improve-
ment, ρ =
πT
C−πT
S
πT
C−πT
DNC
, that renegotiation brings to the system when this contract is
used. Renegotiation is particularly eﬀective when the contract for options is not,
speciﬁcally when either the coeﬃcient of variation of demand or the spot price is
high.
3.6.1 Coordination under Information Asymmetry
In this section we show how the renegotiation allows coordination of the channel
when the supplier and the manufacturer have asymmetric information about the
demand that the manufacturer faces. Furthermore, in this section we assume
that the supplier is the leader, in which case coordination is not achieved without
renegotiation. We assume that a demand signal θ ∈ [θ,θ] can be observed by the
manufacturer but not by the supplier. We assume that θ has c.d.f. G(θ), which
is common knowledge to both the supplier and the manufacturer. The demand
distribution c.d.f. given θ is F(D|θ), again is common knowledge to both players,
and it is stochastically increasing in θ.
As we saw before, when renegotiation is allowed, the channel is coordinated
when the supplier sets the production quantity such that QP = Q∗
CP and the
manufacturer sets the reservation quantity such that Q ≤ Q∗
CP. Consider the
supplier’s problem ﬁrst. If the supplier can proﬁtably sell to the spot market,
P S − m − b ≥ 0, then for any value of θ the supplier sets QP = K = Q∗
CP. If the
supplier sells to the spot market at a loss, P S − m − b < 0, then the supplier sets
QP according to the newsvendor solution:
Eθ[F(QP|θ)] =
P S − b
m
.75
Table 3.2: A single-price contract with unrestricted capacity for triangular spot
price and demand distributions (Part 1).
¯ PS − m − b ≥ 0 ¯ PS − m − b < 0
CVSP CVD m/ ¯ PS QCP QS ∆ ρ QCP QS ∆ ρ
0.05 0.05 0.1 300 26.06 11.81 0.131 30.73 26.04 6.09 0.105
0.05 0.05 0.3 300 26.18 34.38 0.127 28.67 26.04 3.47 0.062
0.05 0.05 0.7 300 26.42 75.12 0.119 27.75 26.04 2.25 0.041
0.05 0.20 0.1 300 17.54 37.38 0.415 32.48 17.2 19.44 0.361
0.05 0.20 0.3 300 19.28 96.66 0.358 25.5 17.2 10.59 0.236
0.05 0.20 0.7 300 21.87 173.72 0.276 22.38 17.2 6.47 0.158
0.05 0.40 0.1 300 9.74 61.09 0.679 35.14 8.17 31.06 0.657
0.05 0.40 0.3 300 15.46 135.58 0.502 20.67 7.93 13.43 0.465
0.05 0.40 0.7 300 21.44 212.61 0.337 14.22 7.53 5.99 0.295
0.20 0.05 0.1 300 26.06 11.81 0.131 30.73 26.04 6.09 0.105
0.20 0.05 0.3 300 26.18 34.38 0.127 28.67 26.04 3.47 0.063
0.20 0.05 0.7 300 26.42 75.12 0.119 27.75 26.04 2.25 0.041
0.20 0.20 0.1 300 17.54 37.38 0.415 32.48 17.2 19.44 0.361
0.20 0.20 0.3 300 19.28 96.66 0.358 25.5 17.2 10.59 0.236
0.20 0.20 0.7 300 21.87 173.72 0.276 22.38 17.2 6.47 0.158
Thus, the supplier needs to know the true value of θ in this case in order to choose
the right production quantity.
Now consider the manufacturer’s problem in this case. From (3.9) it follows76
Table 3.3: A single-price contract with unrestricted capacity for triangular spot
price and demand distributions (Part 2).
¯ PS − m − b ≥ 0 ¯ PS − m − b < 0
CVSP CVD m/ ¯ PS QCP QS ∆ ρ QCP QS ∆ ρ
0.20 0.40 0.1 300 9.74 61.09 0.679 35.14 8.17 31.06 0.657
0.20 0.40 0.3 300 15.46 135.58 0.502 20.67 7.93 13.43 0.465
0.20 0.40 0.7 300 21.44 212.61 0.337 14.22 7.53 5.99 0.295
0.40 0.05 0.1 300 26.06 11.81 0.131 30.73 26.04 6.09 0.105
0.40 0.05 0.3 300 26.18 34.38 0.127 28.67 26.04 3.47 0.063
0.40 0.05 0.7 300 26.42 75.12 0.119 27.75 26.04 2.25 0.041
0.40 0.20 0.1 300 17.54 37.38 0.415 32.48 17.2 19.44 0.361
0.40 0.20 0.3 300 19.28 96.66 0.358 25.5 17.2 10.59 0.236
0.40 0.20 0.7 300 21.87 173.72 0.276 22.39 17.2 6.47 0.158
0.40 0.40 0.1 300 9.74 61.09 0.679 35.14 8.17 31.06 0.657
0.40 0.40 0.3 300 15.46 135.58 0.502 20.67 7.93 13.43 0.465
0.40 0.40 0.7 300 21.44 212.61 0.337 14.22 7.53 5.99 0.295
that he sets his reservation quantity according to
1 − F(Q|θ) =
s R ∞
g (PS − g)h(PS)dPS
. (3.11)
Thus, given s and g, the manufacturer’s order quantity is determined by θ, and
the supplier can infer the true value of θ from the reservation quantity Q chosen by
the manufacturer. After observing the signal θobserved indirectly through the man-
ufacturer’s reservation quantity the supplier can set the production order quantity77
optimally, so that
F(QP|θobserved) =
P S − b
m
, (3.12)
which results in QP = Q∗
CP, because θobserved = θ.
To achieve channel coordination we also need Q ≤ Q∗
CP. This condition is
always satisﬁed if PS − m − b ≥ 0, because in this case the supplier produces up
to her capacity, QP = K and the manufacturer chooses the reservation quantity
which is the smallest of his unconstrained optimal quantity and the supplier’s
capacity, Q = min(Q∗,K). Thus, no matter what s and g the supplier chooses,
the manufacturer sets Q ≤ Q∗
CP = K. If PS −m−b < 0, then the optimal supply
chain performance is guaranteed by the condition Q ≤ Q∗
CP, which is equivalent
to
F(Q|θ) ≤ F(Q
∗
CP|θ)
which, as follows from (3.11) and (3.12), is in turn equivalent to
1 −
s R ∞
g (PS − g)h(PS)dPS
≤
P S − b
m
. (3.13)
Therefore, the supplier needs to choose s and g that satisfy (3.13). We now show
that when the supplier chooses prices (s,g) as in the original contract for options,
then condition (3.13) is satisﬁed.
Indeed, when PS −m−b < 0, the supplier solves the following equation to ﬁnd
the optimal s:
Q
∗ −
1
EθrF(Q∗|θ)
·
"
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
R ∞
g (PS − g)h(PS)dPS
−
b + m − PS
s
#
= 0.
Since Q ≥ 0, it follows that we must have
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
R ∞
g (PS − g)h(PS)dPS
−
b + m − PS
s
≥ 0,78
which is equivalent to
s R ∞
g (PS − g)h(PS)dPS
≥
b + m − PS
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
. (3.14)
¿From (3.14) follows that
1 −
s R ∞
g (PS − g)h(PS)dPS
≤ 1 −
b + m − PS
m
R ∞
g h(PS)dPS
≤ 1 −
b + m − PS
m
=
PS − b
m
Thus, (s,g) that are chosen in this case satisfy (3.13).
Thus, renegotiation is a powerful tool that helps to improve system performance
even when the parties have asymmetric information about the demand distribution.
Because the supplier’s production quantity is independent of the manufacturer’s
reservation quantity when the parties agree to renegotiate at the later stage, the
supplier can screen the manufacturer for his true demand type without sacriﬁcing
system eﬃciency. As follows from (3.10) the total system proﬁt in this case is
independent of the values of the transfer prices that the supplier charges to the
manufacturer. Thus, the supplier’s choice of the reservation and exercise price
does not aﬀect the performance of the system in this case as long as these prices
satisfy (3.13).
Numerical Example
In this section we provide a simple example of how information asymmetry aﬀects
the distribution of the proﬁts in the system. We consider a case when θ = D. We
use a triangular distribution with V ar = 130.67 to model the demand distribution,
and set θ1 = 30 and θ2 = 60, with Pr(θ1) = 0.5,Pr(θ2) = 0.5. To model the spot
price, we use a triangular distribution with P S = 30 and V ar = 30.38. We also
set m = 21, b = 0.5 and K = 300. Table 4.2 shows the contract parameters and
proﬁt distribution in each case. The ﬁrst two lines in the table, for comparison,79
represent the full information cases when the demand is either type 1 or type 2.
The next two lines show the results for the cases when either type 1 or 2 demand
is observed by the manufacturer but not by the supplier. The proﬁt πR is the
supplier’s proﬁt in this case, πT is the proﬁt of the whole system, and C is the
associated manufacturer’s cost. The supplier’s proﬁt πNR without renegotiation is
given for comparison. As we can see the manufacturer beneﬁts from having sole
knowledge of the demand signal θ.
Table 3.4: Optimal contract parameters for triangular spot price and demand
distributions with information asymmetry and renegotiation.
Pr[θ1] Pr[θ2] θobserved s g Q C πR πNR πT
1 0 θ1 5.32 19.78 29.46 799.89 3079.9 2960.6 2280
0 1 θ2 8.54 18.49 52.13 1664.9 3674.9 3461.6 2010
0.5 0.5 θ1 3.83 20.52 32.91 771.91 3051.9 2956.6 2280
0.5 0.5 θ2 3.83 20.52 62.91 1500.7 3510.7 3387.4 2010
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed three diﬀerent mechanisms that lead to supply chain
coordination when a spot market is present. We demonstrated that the chan-
nel can be coordinated with a contract for options when the manufacturer is the
leader, with a quantity discount contract and with a contract for options when
renegotiation is allowed.
The supply chain is coordinated with a contract for options when the manu-
facturer is the leader and the supplier can sell proﬁtably to the spot market. In80
this case the manufacturer extracts all beneﬁts that the contract brings into the
system and leaves nothing to the supplier, but the supplier’s risk due to spot price
uncertainty is decreased. The practical implementation probably requires the man-
ufacturer to give some transfer payment to the supplier in order to motivate her to
use this contract. We showed the optimal contract to be equivalent to Hirshleifer’s
classic result in the case of a competitive market for an intermediate good, which
states that the channel is coordinated in this case if the transfer price is equal to
the competitive market price.
Another way to coordinate the channel is with a quantity discount contract.
However, the leader, who proposes the contract price, is the only one who beneﬁts
from the contract. Thus, again, a transfer payment might be required in order
to implement this mechanism. Speciﬁcally, a transfer payment should be made
contingent upon the reservation quantity chosen by the follower in this case, and
should be positive only if the reservation quantity Q satisﬁes Q = Q∗
CP.
We showed that the contract for options coordinates the supply chain if the par-
ties can renegotiate the exercise price and quantity after the demand and the spot
price are observed. Renegotiation also coordinates the channel with a single-price
contract and when the supplier and the manufacturer have asymmetric information
about the manufacturer’s demand. When the supplier anticipates renegotiation,
she can screen the manufacturer for his true demand type and then set her pro-
duction quantity using the information that she infers about demand from the
manufacturer’s reservation quantity. For the types of the contracts that we con-
sidered the supplier is the only one who beneﬁts from renegotiation and, thus, she
might ﬁnd it useful to motivate the manufacturer to renegotiate by oﬀering better
terms of trade. Fortunately, that ﬂexibility is available by adjustment of the con-81
tract parameters with either a single-price contract or contract for options. Thus,
renegotiation appears to be a robust mechanism that coordinates the channel un-
der a wide variety of circumstances. Moreover, unlike the other mechanisms, the
supplier and the manufacturer share the contract beneﬁts.
One possible extension to this problem is to consider the eﬀect of renegotiation
on a similar system with multiple manufacturers to assess whether renegotiation
between the supplier and a manufacturer or renegotiation between a manufacturer
and another manufacturer is more eﬀective.Chapter 4
Allocation Rules and Supply Chain
Coordination
4.1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze a model in which two manufacturers and a single sup-
plier invest in capacity prior to the realization of demand. All players make their
capacity investment decisions at the same time in a ﬁrst stage and their capacity
choice constrains their ability to satisfy demand at a later stage. The supplier
must also choose an allocation rule that determines how the supplier’s capacity
is divided between the manufacturers when it is insuﬃcient to satisfy their total
demand. We consider two diﬀerent manipulable allocation rules (proportional and
linear) in order to assess the eﬀect that the allocation rule has on the supplier’s and
manufacturers’ capacity choice. We also evaluate how transfer prices inﬂuence the
players’ capacity choices. We compare the performance of a linear-price contract
with that of a contract for options.
We add to the existing literature by modeling capacity constraints at the man-
ufacturers’ and the supplier’s sites. We show that with a linear-price contract
the manufacturers’ capacity investment decisions are independent of the alloca-
tion rule. In fact, the allocation rule is important to the manufacturer only when
he places his actual order and not when he makes his capacity investment.
We show that with linear-price contract the players’ proﬁt functions are concave
in their respective capacity levels. We show that with the contract for options the
each manufacturer’s proﬁt function is concave in both its reservation quantity and
8283
its capacity level. We also show that the supplier’s proﬁt function is concave in
reservation price and in exercise price.
Our numerical results show that with both contracts the supply chain’s proﬁt
can be equal to at least 92% of the centralized proﬁt, but with a linear-price
contract that is only possible if the supplier is the one who sets the prices. The
administration of either contract presents a certain level of complexity. With a
linear-price contract the supplier must use an allocation rule. With the contract
for options the manufacturer might need to select an appropriate penalty cost that
assures that the supplier indeed builds suﬃcient capacity to fulﬁll the contract.
In Section 4.2 we provide a literature review. We describe our model and pro-
vide analytical and numerical analysis in Section 4.3. We present our conclusions
in Section 4.4.
4.2 Literature Review
In the recent years much attention has been given to the performance of contracts
in decentralized supply chains. Cachon (2003) gives a very good review on the
most recent literature in that area. One of the contracts that he analyzes, and
that we analyze in this paper is the contract for options. Several papers consider
the contract for options, its ability to coordinate the supply chain and ensure in-
centive compatibility for both players. Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002) investigate a
two-period model with a single supplier acting as a leader and a single buyer, in
which the buyer can purchase a certain number of options as well as place a ﬁrm
order each period. Cachon and Lariviere (2001) consider a similar model (where
the buyer acts as a leader), and analyze two diﬀerent compliance regimes (vol-
untary compliance and forced compliance) and two diﬀerent information sharing84
cases (full information and asymmetric information). The authors show that the
contract compliance regime signiﬁcantly aﬀects the outcome of the game. One of
the conclusions that both papers make is that the contract for options while sig-
niﬁcantly improving performance of the decentralized supply chain does not lead
to the channel coordination. Barnes-Schuster et al. also show that the supplier is
able to extract all beneﬁts generated by the contract for options.
The problem where all the players have to make their capacity investments prior
to the demand realization is considered in Tomlin (2003). The author compares
the performance of piecewise-linear, quantity-discount and quantity-premium con-
tracts with linear-price contract in the supply chain with a single supplier and a
single manufacturer. The author shows the existence of coordinating price-only
contracts that arbitrarily allocate the supply chain proﬁt and demonstrates that
for certain values of the supplier’s reservation proﬁt the manufacturer prefers a
simple piecewise-linear, quantity-premium contract.
The supplier’s allocation problem was considered in Cachon and Lariviere
(1999). The authors analyze the behavior of the multiple retailers under diﬀer-
ent allocation mechanisms: truth-inducing and manipulable. They also consider
the supplier’s capacity decision under diﬀerent allocation schemes. The authors
show that under manipulable allocation mechanisms the proﬁts of the supplier, the
retailers, and the whole supply chain are higher than under truth-inducing mech-
anisms. Deshpande and Schwarz (2002) is another paper that considers diﬀerent
allocation rules in the supply chain with multiple buyers. The authors show that if
manipulable mechanisms are replaced by a certain optimal truth-telling allocation
mechanism then the supplier’s and the supply chain’s proﬁts can be signiﬁcantly
increased.85
We add to this literature by considering the eﬀect of two manipulable allocation
mechanisms on the players’ capacity investment decisions. We also show that the
contract for options is able to signiﬁcantly improve the proﬁts of the supplier and
the supply chain eventhough no allocation rule is needed. This result is similar to
the one of Plambeck and Taylor (2002). The authors consider how the possibility
of renegotiation aﬀects the supply chain with one supplier and two buyers, where
players engage in quantity ﬂexibility contracts. The supplier is the only one who
must invest in the capacity. The authors demonstrate that in many cases the
contract for options provides a better alternative to the quantity ﬂexibility contract
with renegotiation and signiﬁcantly improves the supply chain performance. We
show that the contract for options outperforms linear-price contracts in the system
with two manufacturers but gives the manufacturers no incentive to use it.
4.3 The Model
In this chapter we consider a supply chain in which two identical manufacturers
contract with a single supplier for available resources. Both the supplier and the
two manufacturers must invest in their capacity before the demand for the end
product is known. The players incur a marginal capacity cost that is cM for the
manufacturer and cS for the supplier. After demand is realized the manufacturers
order and pay for the supplier’s component, which is produced at the marginal cost
pS, and use it to produce their ﬁnal product at marginal production cost pM. They
sell this product to their customer at a ﬁxed retail price r with r > cM+cS+pM+pS.
We use x1 and x2 to denote the respective demands of manufacturers 1 and 2. We
use f(x) and F(x) to denote pdf and cdf of the manufacturers’ demand. The
sequence of events is depicted in Figure 4.1.86
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Figure 4.1: Event Timeline
4.3.1 Centralized System
In this section we consider how the players set their capacity levels in the centralized
system. This is the benchmark by which we will judge the other contracts in a
decentralized supply chain. A single decision-maker chooses the capacity levels of
the supplier yS and each manufacturer yM that maximize the expected proﬁt of
the supply chain, πC(yS,yM),
πC(yS,yM) = Ex1,x2 [−cSyS − 2cMyM
+(r − pM − pS)(min[yS,min(yM,x1),min(yM,x2)])].87
After taking the expectations, we have
πC(yS,yM) = −cSyS − 2cMyM + (r − pM − pS)
Z yS−yM
0
f(x1)
Z yM
0
(x1 + x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yS−yM
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
(x1 + yM)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yS−x1
0
(x1 + x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS−x1
ySf(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yS−yM
0
(x2 + yM)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS−yM
ySf(x2)dx2dx1

.
We can show that this function is concave in yS and yM. Indeed,
∂πC
∂yM
= 2

−cM + (r − pM − pS)
Z yS−yM
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
f(x2)dx2dx1

,
∂πC
∂yS
= −cS + (r − pM − pS)·
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS−x1
f(x2)dx2dx1 +
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS−yM
f(x2)dx2dx1

,
∂2πC
∂y2
M
= 2(r − pM − pS)(−f(yM)F(yS − yM) − f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM))) < 0,
∂2πC
∂y2
S
= (r − pM − pS)·

−2f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM)) −
Z yM
yS−yM
f(yS − x)f(x)dx

< 0,
∂2πC
∂yS∂yM
= 2(r − pM − pS)f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM)),
from which the concavity of function πC(yS,yM) follows. Thus, we can ﬁnd the
optimal capacity yC
S and yC
M levels from:
Z yC
S −yC
M
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yC
M
f(x2)dx2dx1 =
cM
(r − pM − pS)
, (4.1)88
 Z yC
M
yC
S −yC
M
f(x1)
Z ∞
yC
S −x1
f(x2)dx2dx1 + (1 − F(y
C
M))
Z ∞
yC
S −yC
M
f(x2)dx2
=
cS
(r − pM − pS)
. (4.2)
It follows that the amount of capacity reserved by the manufacturer increases in
the level of the supplier’s capacity yC
S:
∂yC
M
∂yC
S
=
f(yC
S − yC
M)(1 − F(yC
M))
f(yC
S − yC
M)(1 − F(yC
M)) + f(yC
M)F(yC
S − yC
M)
> 0.
4.3.2 Linear-Price Contract
Now we consider the players’ capacity investments when system is decentralized.
In this case, the capacity level chosen by the player maximizes its private proﬁt
function. Since the supplier might not build enough capacity to satisfy the man-
ufacturers’ orders, she must also choose an allocation rule that she will use when
the total quantity ordered by the manufacturers exceeds the amount that she can
produce given her capacity constraint. We want to see how the allocation rules
aﬀects the capacity decisions of the players. We consider two diﬀerent allocation
schemes: linear and proportional allocation. We assume that the supplier charges
the manufacturers a transfer price pT for each unit purchased.
We start with the supplier’s problem, which does not depend on the allocation89
rule and can be stated as:
max
yS
πS(yS) = −cSyS + (pT − pS)
Z yS−yM
0
f(x1)
Z yM
0
(x1 + x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yS−yM
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
(x1 + yM)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yS−x1
0
(x1 + x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS−x1
ySf(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yS−yM
0
(x2 + yM)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS−yM
ySf(x2)dx2dx1

.
Since
∂2πS
∂y2
S
= (pT − pS)

−2f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM)) −
Z yM
yS−yM
f(yS − x)f(x)dx

< 0,
the function is concave in yS and we can ﬁnd optimal supplier’s capacity yS by
solving
∂πS
∂yS = 0, i.e.,
(pT − pS)
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS−x1
f(x2)dx2dx1 +
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS−yM
f(x2)dx2dx1
= cS. (4.3)
Now we consider each manufacturer’s problem with diﬀerent allocation schemes.
We assume for now that due to information symmetry players are not able to
manipulate their orders in order to increase their proﬁts. We will relax this as-
sumption later on in order to evaluate the eﬀect of information asymmetry on the
manufacturers’ decisions.90
Proportional Allocation
With the proportional allocation mechanism, given manufacturer i0s order mi, he
is allocated
gi(m) = min
 
mi,
ySmi P
j mj
!
.
Thus, each manufacturer’s expected proﬁt in this case is
πM(yS) = −cMyM + (r − pM − pT)
Z yS−yM
0
x1f(x1)dx1 +
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yS−x1
0
x1f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yM
yS−x1
x1yS
x1 + x2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
x1yS
x1 + yM
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yS−yM
0
yMf(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yM
yS−yM
yMyS
x2 + yM
f(x2)dx2dx1

.
The function is concave in yM since
∂2πM
∂y2
M
= (r − pM − pT)(−f(yM)F(yS − yM) − f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM))) < 0,
and the optimal yM is a solution of
(r − pM − pT)
Z yS−yM
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
f(x2)dx2dx1 = cM. (4.4)
Linear Allocation
If we index N manufacturers in the decreasing order of their order quantities, i.e.,
(m1 ≥ m2 ≥ ... ≥ mN), then the quantity allocated to the manufacturer i with91
linear allocation is
gi(m,e n) =

 
 
mi − 1
e n max(0,
P
j mj − K), i ≤ e n
0, i > e n
where e n is the largest integer less than or equal to N such that gi(m,e n) ≥ 0.
Each manufacturer’s expected proﬁt in this case is
πM(yS) = −cMyM + (r − pM − pT)
Z yS−yM
0
x1f(x1)dx1 +
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yS−x1
0
x1f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yM
yS−x1
x1 − x2 + yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
x1 − yM + yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yS−yM
0
yMf(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yM
yS−yM
yM + yS − x2
2
f(x2)dx2dx1

.
The function is concave in yM since
∂2πM
∂y2
M
= (r − pM − pT)(−f(yM)F(yS − yM) − f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM))) < 0,
and the optimal yM is a solution of
(r − pM − pT)
Z yS−yM
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
f(x2)dx2dx1 = cM. (4.5)
¿From (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5), we can see that with linear or proportional
allocation there does not exist pT such that the centralized solution is achieved.
Still, concavity of the supplier’s and the manufacturers’ proﬁt functions guarantees
the existence of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) in this game. Now we will show that
this equilibrium is unique.92
Suppose that Ri(aj) is a reaction function of the player i to the action chosen
by the player j. The suﬃcient condition for the NE to be unique is
  

∂Ri(aj)
∂aj
  
 =
   
 
−
∂2π(Ri(aj))
∂ai∂aj
∂2π(Ri(aj))
∂a2
i
   
 
< 1.
This condition holds for our problem because
   
∂RM(aS)
∂aS
    =
f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM))
f(yM)F(yS − yM) + f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM))
< 1,
   
∂RS(aM)
∂aM

   =
2f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM)) R yM
yS−yM f(yS − x)f(x)dx + 2f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM))
< 1.
Information Asymmetry
In this section we evaluate the eﬀect that information asymmetry has on the manu-
facturers’ capacity choices. When manufacturers possess private information about
their actual demand they might choose to inﬂate their orders in order to maximize
their proﬁts. Both linear and proportional allocation rules give the manufacturers
an opportunity to manipulate their order quantities in this manner. However, the
manufacturer expects that the other manufacturer is also rational and manipulates
his order quantity as well.
We start with proportional allocation. Each manufacturer’s proﬁt function in93
this case is
πM(yS) = −cMyM + (r − pM − pT)
Z yS−yM
0
x1f(x1)dx1 +
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yS−x1
0
x1f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yS/2
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yM
yS−x1
x1f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS/2
f(x1)
Z yS/2
yS−x1
(yS − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS/2
f(x1)
Z yM
yS/2
yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yS/2
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
x1f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS/2
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS/2
yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yS−yM
0
yMf(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yS/2
yS−yM
(yS − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
!
.
The function is concave in yM since
∂2πM
∂y2
M
= (r − pM − pT)(−f(yM)F(yS − yM) − f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM))) < 0,
and the optimal yM is a solution of
(r − pM − pT)
Z yS−yM
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
f(x2)dx2dx1 = cM. (4.6)
In the same way, when the supplier uses linear allocation, each manufacturer’s94
proﬁt function is
πM(yS) = −cMyM + (r − pM − pT)
Z yS−yM
0
x1f(x1)dx1 +
Z yM
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yS−x1
0
x1f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yS/2
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z yM
yS−x1
x1f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS/2
f(x1)
Z yS/2
yS−x1
(yS − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS/2
f(x1)
Z yM
yS/2
yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yS/2
yS−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
x1f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
yS/2
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yS/2
yS
2
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yS−yM
0
yMf(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z yS/2
yS−yM
(yS − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
!
.
This function is also concave in yM because
∂2πM
∂y2
M
= (r − pM − pT)(−f(yM)F(yS − yM) − f(yS − yM)(1 − F(yM))) < 0,
and the optimal yM is a solution of
(r − pM − pT)
Z yS−yM
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
f(x2)dx2dx1 = cM. (4.7)
¿From (4.5), (4.4), (4.6) and (4.7) it follows that the manufacturer builds the same
amount of capacity even when he plans to manipulate his order at the next stage.
Thus, the ability to manipulate the order quantity important for the manufacturers
only at the second stage when the actual product is ordered.95
4.3.3 Contract for Options
In this section we analyze whether the contract for options induces the players to
build the optimal amount of capacity, or at least provides some improvement over
the decentralized case with linear pricing.
The supplier oﬀers the manufacturers a set of prices (s,g), where s is a reserva-
tion price per unit and g is an exercise price per unit. Each manufacturer reserves
Q units of capacity. We assume that the supplier indeed builds 2Q units of capacity
in order to satisfy manufacturers’ orders at the next stage.
Since the supplier builds 2Q, she need not use an allocation rule to distribute
her capacity. Rather, if one of the players has demand less than Q and another
one has demand greater than Q but smaller than yM, the supplier can sell some
additional quantity to the latter manufacturer at some transfer price pT. For
convenience we assume that pT = g.
We start with the manufacturers’ problem. Given (s,g), each manufacturer
decides how much capacity to reserve from the supplier and how much capacity to
build at his site. Consider the ﬁrst manufacturer. His problem can be formulated
as
π
1
M(yM,Q) = Ex[−sQ − cMyM + (r − pM − g)min(Q,yM,x1)
+ (r − pM − pT)min([min(x1,yM) − Q]
+,[Q − min(x2,yM)]
+)],96
or after taking the expectation
π
1
M(yM,Q) = −sQ − cMyM + (r − pM − g)
Z Q
0
x1f(x1)dx1 +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(x1)dx1
+
Z yM
Q
(x1 − Q)f(x1)
Z 2Q−x1
0
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
Q
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−x1
(Q − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z 2Q−yM
0
(yM − Q)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−yM
(Q − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1

.
The second manufacturer faces an identical problem. The concavity of each man-
ufacturer’s proﬁt function follows from
∂2πM
∂y2
M
= −2(r − pM − g)(f(yM)F(2Q − yM)
+ f(2Q − yM)(1 − F(yM))) < 0,
∂2πM
∂Q2 = −4(r − pM − g)f(2Q − yM)
Z ∞
Q
f(x)dx < 0,
∂2πM
∂Q∂yM
= 2(r − pM − g)f(2Q − yM)(1 − F(yM)).
Thus, we can calculate values of optimal yM and Q from the following equations
(r − pM − g)
Z 2Q−yM
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
f(x2)dx2dx1 = cM, (4.8)

(1 − F(Q))
2 + 2
Z yM
Q
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−x1
f(x2)dx2dx1
+2(1 − F(yM))
Z Q
2Q−yM
f(x2)dx2

=
s
(r − pM − g)
. (4.9)
The supply chain is coordinated if yC
S = 2Q and yC
M = yM. ¿From (4.1), (4.2),
(4.8) and (4.9) we conclude that this is possible only if g = pS and s = cS − (r −97
pM − pS)(1 − F(yC
S)). But that is not incentive compatible for the supplier whose
expected proﬁt is negative in this case:
πS(s,g) = −y
C
S(r − pM − pS)(1 − F(y
C
S) < 0.
Now we consider the supplier’s problem. The supplier’s expected proﬁt function
is
πS(s,g) = −2cSQ + 2Qs + 2(g − pS)
Z Q
0
x1f(x1)dx1 +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(x1)dx1
+
Z yM
Q
(x1 − Q)f(x1)
Z 2Q−x1
0
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
Q
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−x1
(Q − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z 2Q−yM
0
(yM − Q)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−yM
(Q − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1

.
Proposition 12 If the demand distribution function is IFR, then the supplier’s
proﬁt function πS(yS) is concave in s for a ﬁxed g, and concave in g for a ﬁxed s .
Proof. Assume that the demand distribution function is IFR. The second
derivative of the supplier’s proﬁt function with respect to s is
∂2πS
∂s2 =
∂Q
∂s

r − pM − pS
r − pM − g
+ 1

+
∂2Q
∂s2

r − pM − pS
r − pM − g

· s,
where
∂Q
∂s
= −
1
4(r − pM − g)
hR yM
Q f(2Q − x)f(x)dx + f(2Q − yM)
R ∞
yM f(x)dx
i < 0
and
∂2Q
∂s2 =
−f2(Q) + 2
R yM
Q f0(2Q − x)f(x)dx + 2
R ∞
yM f0(2Q − yM)f(x)dx
4(r − pM − g)
hR yM
Q f(2Q − x)f(x)dx + f(2Q − yM)
R ∞
yM f(x)dx
i2 ·
∂Q
∂s
.
(4.10)98
∂2Q
∂s2 < 0, because
∂Q
∂s < 0 and the numerator of the ﬁrst factor in (4.10) is positive
because the demand distribution function is IFR. Thus,
∂2πS
∂s2 < 0 and πS is concave
in s.
The second derivative of the supplier’s proﬁt function with respect to g is
∂2πS
∂g2 = 2
∂Q
∂g

s
(r − pM − g)
2 +
s
r − pM − g

+ 2
∂2Q
∂g2

r − pM − pS
r − pM − g
s − cS

,
where
∂Q
∂g
= −
s
4(r − pM − g)2
hR yM
Q f(2Q − x)f(x)dx + f(2Q − yM)
R ∞
yM f(x)dx
i < 0,
and
∂2Q
∂g2 =

−f2(Q) + 2
R yM
Q f0(2Q − x)f(x)dx + 2
R ∞
yM f0(2Q − yM)f(x)dx

s
4(r − pM − g)2
hR yM
Q f(2Q − x)f(x)dx + f(2Q − yM)
R ∞
yM f(x)dx
i2 ·
∂Q
∂g
−
s
2(r − pM − g)3
hR yM
Q f(2Q − x)f(x)dx + f(2Q − yM)
R ∞
yM f(x)dx
i.
∂2Q
∂g2 < 0, because
∂Q
∂g < 0, and 2
R yM
Q f0(2Q−x)f(x)dx+2
R ∞
yM f0(2Q−yM)f(x)dx−
f2(Q) < 0 for IFR distribution functions. Thus,
∂2πS
∂g2 < 0 and πS is concave in g.99
We can ﬁnd optimal s and g from
∂Q
∂s
 
s − cS + (g − pS)(1 − F(Q))
2 + 2
Z yM
Q
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−x1
f(x2)dx2dx1
+ 2
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−yM
f(x2)dx2dx1 + Q = 0,and
2
∂Q
∂g

s − cS + (g − pS)

(1 − F(Q))
2 + 2
Z yM
Q
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−x1
f(x2)dx2dx1
+2
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−yM
f(x2)dx2dx1
+2
Z Q
0
x1f(x1)dx1 +
Z ∞
Q
Qf(x1)dx1
+
Z yM
Q
(x1 − Q)f(x1)
Z 2Q−x1
0
f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
Q
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−x1
(Q − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z 2Q−yM
0
(yM − Q)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z Q
2Q−yM
(Q − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1

= 0,
where
∂Q
∂s
= −
1
4(r − pM − g)
hR yM
Q f(2Q − x)f(x)dx + f(2Q − yM)
R ∞
yM f(x)dx
i, and
−
∂Q
∂g
=
(1 − F(Q))
2 + 2
R yM
Q f(x1)dx1
R Q
2Q−x1 f(x2)dx2 + 2
R ∞
yM f(x1)dx1
R Q
2Q−yM f(x2)dx2
4(r − pM − g)
hR yM
Q f(2Q − x)f(x)dx + f(2Q − yM)
R ∞
yM f(x)dx
i
.
We have assumed so far that the supplier builds 2Q units of capacity. We now
ﬁnd a penalty cost that, if charged by the manufacturer, would guarantee such
capacity investment. Assume that the supplier builds yo
S units of capacity and
that the manufacturer can charge a penalty cost b for each unit that the supplier
fails to deliver due to yo
S < 2Q. The supplier’s expected proﬁt function in this case100
is
πS(yS) = −cSy
o
S + 2Qs + (g − pS)
Z yo
S−Q
0
f(x1)
Z Q
0
(x1 + x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+2
Z yo
S−Q
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
Q
(x1 + Q)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z Q
yo
S−Q
f(x1)
Z yo
S−x1
0
(x1 + x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z Q
yo
S−Q
f(x1)
Z ∞
yo
S−x1
y
o
Sf(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
Q
f(x1)
Z ∞
yo
S−Q
y
o
Sf(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yo
S−yM
0
f(x1)
Z yM
Q
(x2 − Q)f(x2)dx2dx1
+2
Z yo
S−yM
0
f(x1)
Z ∞
yM
(yM − Q)f(x2)dx2dx1
+2
Z yo
S−Q
yo
S−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yo
S−x1
(y
o
S − Q − x1)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yo
S−Q
yo
S−yM
f(x1)
Z yo
S−x1
Q
(x2 − Q)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
Q
f(x1)
Z yo
S−Q
yo
S−x1
(y
o
S − Q − x2)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z yM
Q
f(x1)
Z yo
S−x1
0
(x1 − Q)f(x2)dx2dx1

−b
 
2
Z Q
yo
S−Q
f(x1)
Z ∞
Q
(x1 + Q − y
o
S)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z Q
yo
S−Q
f(x1)
Z Q
yo
S−x1
(x1 + x2 − y
o
S)f(x2)dx2dx1
+
Z ∞
Q
f(x1)
Z ∞
Q
(2Q − y
o
S)f(x2)dx2dx1

.101
The function is concave in yo
S, because
∂2π
∂y2
S
= −b
 
2f(y
o
S − Q)(1 − F(Q)) +
Z Q
yo
S−Q
f(y
o
S − x)f(x)dx
!
− (g − pS)
 
2f(y
o
S − yM)(1 − F(yM)) +
Z yo
S
yo
S−yM
f(y
o
S − x)f(x)dx
!
and
∂2π
∂y2
S
< 0.
Thus, optimal yo
S is calculated from
0 = −cS + b
 Z Q
yo
S−Q
f(x1)
Z ∞
yo
S−x1
f(x2)dx2dx1 +
Z ∞
Q
f(x1)
Z ∞
yo
S−Q
f(x2)dx2dx1
!
(4.11)
+ (g − pS)
 Z ∞
yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yo
S−yM
f(x2)dx2dx1 +
Z yM
yo
S−yM
f(x1)
Z ∞
yo
S−x1
f(x2)dx2dx1
!
.
It follows from (4.11) that to assure that the supplier indeed builds 2Q units of
the capacity, the manufacturer must set b at the following level
b =
cS − (g − pS)
R ∞
yM f(x1)
R ∞
2Q−yM f(x2)dx2dx1 +
R yM
2Q−yM f(x1)
R ∞
2Q−x1 f(x2)dx2dx1

R ∞
Q f(x)dx
2 .
4.3.4 Numerical Results
In this section we numerically evaluate the linear-price contract and contract for
options. The following numerical results are presented for the uniform demand
distribution [0,a] and unless noted otherwise the system parameters are set at the
following values: r = 10,cS = 1,cM = 1,pS = 1,pM = 1.
The numerical results demonstrate that neither the linear-price contract nor
the contract for options coordinates the supply chain. Some of the results are102
shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The contract for options performs better and guar-
antees at least 93% of the centralized system proﬁt, but each manufacturer’s proﬁt
is always zero in this case. With a linear-price contract, the manufacturers some-
times build extra capacity in anticipation of a lower than expected demand at
the other manufacturer’s site. On the other hand, with a contract for options the
manufacturer builds as much capacity as he reserves from the supplier. Thus, he
does not expect to beneﬁt from low demand at the other manufacturer. However,
the manufacturers as well as the supplier build more capacity with the contract
for options than with linear-price contract, but less than they would build in the
centralized system.
Table 4.1: Optimal capacity levels and corresponding expected proﬁts in the cen-
tralized system.
a yC
S yC
M πC
100 143 80 455
110 157 88 499
120 171 96 545
130 185 104 590
140 200 112 636
As Figures 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate, the supplier beneﬁts most from a linear-
price contract when the transfer price is the highest and the manufacturers’ ex-
pected proﬁts are approaching zero. The supply chain proﬁt is also greater with
a greater transfer price and represents 92% of the centralized system proﬁt at the
highest transfer price (for our parameter values) that is still incentive compatible103
Table 4.2: Optimal contract parameters in linear-price contract and contract for
options
a pT yL
S yL
M πL
S πL
M s g Q yO
M πO
S πO
M b
100 7.6 110 55 418 0.4 1.92 5.4 59 59 430 0 1.7
110 7.6 121 60.5 459 0.8 1.94 5.4 65 65 472 0 1.6
120 7.6 132 66 500 0.9 1.96 5.4 71 71 515 0 1.5
130 7.6 142 71 542 0.99 1.97 5.4 75 75 554 0 1.2
140 7.6 154 77 584 1.1 1.98 5.4 80 80 595 0 1.0
for the manufacturers. As the transfer price increases it becomes more proﬁtable
for the supplier to sell to the manufacturers, thus, she is willing to invest in more
capacity. Higher transfer price makes the manufacturers more risk averse and
less willing to invest in capacity. Thus, there is a value of pT above which the
manufacturers’ capacity investments are equal exactly to the supplier’s capacity
investment.
We tested the eﬀect that changes in that the supplier’s and manufacturers’
capacity investments and production costs had on the performance of the contract
for options. We can see from Figure 4.4 that with a contract for options the
supplier’s and the supply chain’s proﬁts are decreasing in the values of cM,cS,pM
and pS. The higher the values of those parameters the less willing the players
are to invest in extra capacity and thus less capable of satisfying higher demand,
ultimately sacriﬁcing some portion of the supply chain’s proﬁt. Because the value
of cM has the highest eﬀect on the manufacturers’ capacity investment decisions
it also has the greatest eﬀect on the change in the proﬁts. At the same time, the104
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Figure 4.4: Supplier’s Proﬁt with Contract for Options
value of pS has the smallest eﬀect, mostly because this cost is incurred by the
supplier and after the demand is observed.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper we consider a supply chain comprised of a single supplier and two
manufacturers. All players make their capacity investment decisions prior to the
demand realization. When a linear-price contract is used, the supplier must also
choose an allocation rule that is used when the manufacturers’ orders exceed the
available amount of goods.
We proved that the manufacturers’ and the supplier’s proﬁt functions are con-
cave in their capacity levels. We also showed that with a linear-price contract the
manufacturers’ capacity investments do not depend on whether the allocation rule
is linear or proportional. We showed that the manufacturers would set transfer107
price very low, maximize their own proﬁts and leave nothing to the supplier. The
supplier would choose a very high transfer price that would maximize both her
and the supply chain’s proﬁts but leave nothing to the manufacturers. We showed
that the manufacturers’ decisions about the capacity investment do not depend on
their decision to manipulate their order at the next stage.
We prove that with a contract for options the supplier’s proﬁt function is con-
cave in the reservation price and in the exercise price. We also proved that each
manufacturer’s proﬁt function is concave in the reservation quantity as well as in
each manufacturer’s capacity investment decision. Again, as with a linear-price
contract, the supplier, who is in a position to choose prices, leaves the manufac-
turers with nothing.
Our numerical results show that both contracts can bring the supply chain
proﬁt up to 92% of the centralized proﬁt but with linear-price contract that is
only possible if the supplier sets the prices. When the manufacturers set the prices
with the linear-price contract the supply chain’s proﬁt represents only 71% of the
centralized system’s proﬁt.
The contract for options might be preferred in the supply chain because it
does not involve any allocation rules. However, to guarantee that the supplier
builds enough capacity, a certain penalty cost must be charged. Unfortunately,
that might make this contract as complex as a liner price contract with allocation
rules.
Some further work can be done in order to understand what happens in the
system when truth-telling allocation mechanisms are used. It might also be in-
teresting to see whether a contract with non-linear prices can improve the supply
chain performance and allow for arbitrary allocation of proﬁts.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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